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Mental disorder diagnoses are currently based on arbitrary symptom checklists and lack the 
identification of underlying neurological dysfunction. As a result, clinicians assign diagnostic 
labels with low accuracy, leading to poor treatment selection and delivery and reduced quality 
of life for many individuals. Goal Conflict Specific Rhythmicity (GCSR), measured using a 
Stop Signal Task (SST), appears to be the first neural biomarker for diagnosing one process 
underlying clinical anxiety. While previous research has shown that GCSR is an ‘anxiolytic-
sensitive’ biomarker, the present study aimed to take the first steps toward validating GCSR as 
a ‘clinical anxiety’ biomarker within a patient sample. According to McNaughton and Corr 
(2004)’s theory, it was predicted that patients diagnosed with Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5) ‘anxiety disorders’ would on average show higher 
GCSR than control participants. In this study, the Electroencephalogram (EEG) of 86 
participants recruited from Student Job Search (SJS) and 21 patients diagnosed with DSM-5 
anxiety disorders was recorded while participants underwent a SST. GCSR values of SJS 
participants who obtained Spielberger’s Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) scores in both the clinically 
high and normal ranges were compared to GCSR obtained by anxiety disorder patients. 
Consistent with predictions, GCSR tended to be higher in individuals diagnosed with DSM-5 
anxiety disorders compared to SJS controls with low STAI-T scores. GCSR also tended to 
increase in the positive direction as STAI-T scores increased, with anxious patients producing 
similar, if not higher, GCSR than SJS participants with STAI-T scores in the clinical range. 
Overall, these results provide preliminary support for GCSR as the first biological biomarker 
for one clinical anxiety process. Further research, including a larger sample of anxiety disorder 
patients and an appropriately matched healthy control group, is required to strengthen 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Anxiety: a problem for the individual and society 
Mental disorders are prevalent and extremely disabling. About half the people in New Zealand 
will meet diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder in their lifetime (Oakley-Browne, Wells, 
Scott, Kessler, & Üstün, 2008). Anxiety disorders are the most common type of mental disorder 
in New Zealand, and are experienced by 15% of the general population in a given 12-month 
period. Alarmingly, one in four New Zealanders will suffer from an anxiety disorder at least 
once in their lifetime (Oakley-Browne et al., 2008). Clearly, these often silent and hidden 
disorders are severely affecting the lives of many in our society. 
 Anxiety disorders create a large economic burden on the population as a consequence 
of psychiatric and psychological treatment costs, unemployment/sickness benefits, lost work 
days and poor physical health (Baxter, Vos, Scott, Ferrari, & Whiteford, 2014; Marciniak, 
Lage, Landbloom, Dunayevich, & Bowman, 2004; Smit et al., 2006). Furthermore, they 
impose a heavy burden on the afflicted individuals and their families through lowered 
employment opportunities,  impaired psychosocial functioning and compromised quality of 
life (Andrews, Henderson, & Hall, 2001; Mendlowicz & Stein, 2000).  In a systematic review 
of data in 2010, 7% of all suicides globally were attributed to anxiety (Baxter et al., 2014). 
Epidemiological surveys administered by the World Health Organisation World Mental Health 
Survey Initiative have found that the disability in social and personal role functioning attributed 
to anxiety disorders is greater than the disability attributed to a range of physical disorders 
including arthritis, asthma, back/neck pain, cancer, chronic pain, diabetes, headaches, heart 
disease, high blood pressure, and stomach ulcers (Ormel et al., 2008). It is important we address 
this concerning problem facing the general population.  
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Current diagnoses and treatment of anxiety  
Medical professionals and clinicians have significant difficulty accurately diagnosing 
anxiety disorders. In primary care settings, only one third of individuals suffering from anxiety 
are correctly identified (Lecrubier, 2000), and furthermore, only an estimated one to two thirds 
of patients receive the correct specific anxiety disorder diagnosis (Olariu et al., 2015). In 
particular, Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is the most difficult anxiety disorder to 
diagnose and has a recognition rate in primary care of only 33% (Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, 
& Campbell, 2001; Weiller, Bisserbe, Maier, & Lecrubier, 1997). Krueger (1999) conducted a 
factor analysis of anxiety disorder symptom patterns and found significant overlap between 
anxiety syndromes. He concluded that focusing on the symptom manifestations of separate 
anxiety disorders may give rise to diagnostic problems, and advocated identification of ‘core 
psychopathological problems’ to diagnose anxiety subtypes instead.  
Poor diagnostic accuracy has significant negative implications for treatment success 
and long-term patient prognosis. Patients must first be correctly identified before they can be 
successfully treated. Understanding the organic cause of a client’s presenting problems is 
fundamental to appropriately selecting and implementing individualised and effective 
treatments.  Failure to do so can limit the success of treatments and long-term recovery. 
Currently, less than one third of primary care patients with anxiety disorders receive adequate 
psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy treatments that meet the criterion for quality care 
(Mendlowicz & Stein, 2014). While multiple factors may account for this finding, we cannot 
overlook the contribution of current diagnostic limitations. An improved system of diagnosis 
is thus required. This, in turn, will guide more accurate prediction of treatment response and 
the selection and delivery of effective interventions and quality care.  
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Limitations of current diagnostic systems 
Currently, mental disorders in general and anxiety disorders in particular have no 
biological means of diagnosis (Insel et al., 2010). Instead, they are diagnosed using clinician-
defined, symptom-based, criteria. One commonly used diagnostic system is the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, currently in its 5th edition (DSM-5, American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). According to the DSM-5, ‘Anxiety Disorders’ is a broad label 
that includes Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Specific Phobia (SP), Panic Disorder (PD), 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD), Agoraphobia, Selective Mutism, Separation Anxiety Disorder, 
Anxiety Disorder due to Another Medical Condition, Substance/Medication-induced Anxiety 
Disorder, and Other Specified, or Unspecified Anxiety Disorder. Thus, DSM-5 ‘Anxiety 
Disorders’ include features of both excessive fear and excessive anxiety, where ‘fear’ is defined 
as the emotional reaction to immediate/imminent threat or danger that is either real or 
perceived, and ‘anxiety’ is defined as the emotional reaction that accompanies the anticipation 
of future threat/danger (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD) was previously placed within the ‘Anxiety Disorder’ category in the third and 
fourth editions of the DSM, however is classified separately in the DSM-5 under ‘Obsessive-
Compulsive and Related Disorders’. In comparison, another diagnostic system known as The 
World Health Organisation International Classification of Diseases, now in its 10th edition 
(ICD-10, World Health Organization)  does distinguish phobias from anxieties, but groups 
anxieties with depression within “neurotic, stress-related, and somatoform” disorders. Across 
DSM-5 and ICD-10, there is currently no clear distinction between anxiety and fear. Although 
clinicians rely heavily on these diagnostic schemes, some major limitations have been raised 




General medicine repeatedly emphasises the need to understand (and treat) the root 
cause of pathology rather than merely observe and ‘place a Band-Aid’ on the superficial 
symptoms. Unfortunately, psychiatry fails to match the use of biological diagnostic tests and 
objective biomarkers that is widely observed in general medicine. Instead, the DSM-5 and ICD-
10 assign diagnoses depending on the type of superficial symptoms a patient presents with (e.g. 
chest tightness, breathlessness) and the specific situations where these arise (e.g. social 
situations, enclosed spaces).  Although these presenting symptoms may provide an indication 
of the underlying pathology, biological diagnostic tools are essential if we are to arrive at 
confident and accurate conclusions.  
The medical phenomenon of ‘chest pain’ provides one clear illustrative example of the 
importance of identifying the organic cause of pathology. Even if we exclude psychiatric 
causes, symptoms of chest pain can reflect a variety of underlying dysfunctions including a 
cardiac arrest or a type of gastro-oesophageal disease (Fruergaard et al., 1996).  If the symptom 
‘chest pain’ was considered alone and used to develop a treatment protocol, identical treatments 
would be delivered to patients with potentially very distinct sources of pathology and often 
result in death. Physiological tests instead are used to confirm the exact underlying pathology 
and determine the type of treatment required. The diagnosis of a cardiac arrest is contingent 
upon observing an abnormal electrocardiogram and high levels of cardiac enzymes in a blood 
test. Conversely, the diagnosis of a gastro-oesophageal disease is contingent upon obtaining 
positive results on an oesophago-gastro duodenoscopy, pH monitoring in the oesophagus, and 
oesophageal manometry (Fruergaard et al., 1996). Once these unique underlying pathologies 
are identified, distinct treatments can be implemented.  
 In a similar way to general medicine, the diagnosis of psychological disorders should 
be based on underlying dysfunction rather than symptom presentations (Krueger, 1999). This 
is because, like chest pain, similar clinical anxiety symptoms may arise from a variety of 
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distinct pathologies and therefore require distinct treatments. Conversely, diverse symptom 
profiles may in fact be a consequence of the same underlying dysfunction and therefore require 
similar treatment approaches. An improved method of recognising the unique dysfunction 
underlying specific types of anxiety is critical to improving the current status of patient care 
and prognosis.  
Further limitations associated with the clinical utility of the DSM-5 and ICD-10 have 
also been identified. Specifically, the boundaries distinguishing different DSM-5 and ICD-10 
anxiety disorders do not accurately predict treatment response (Insel et al., 2010). For example, 
45% of patients diagnosed with Panic Disorder (PD) do not respond to recommended first line 
treatments for PD (i.e. Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, Marchesi, 2008; Otto, Tuby, 
Gould, McLean, & Pollack, 2001).  Furthermore, the DSM-5 and the ICD-10 generally allow 
only a single primary diagnosis for each patient (i.e., they allow no co-morbid or secondary 
diagnosis). Although this simplifies the conceptualisation of a patient’s psychological 
difficulties, mental disorders are rarely pure in real life. More than 90% of patients with 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) also present with at least one further co-morbid 
psychiatric condition (Kessler, Keller, & Wittchen, 2001).  Among those diagnosed with GAD, 
80% meet the diagnostic criteria for multiple axis 1 disorder diagnoses, which includes all 
psychological diagnoses except intellectual disabilities and personality disorders. Furthermore, 
60% meet diagnostic criteria for multiple anxiety disorders (Reinhold, Mandos, Rickels, & 
Lohoff, 2011). Failure to account for co-morbidity and/or the presence of secondary disorders 
may result in limited treatment success leading to prolonged psychological disturbance.  
There is thus a clear need to address these current limitations in mental disorder 
diagnosis. Fortunately, research has revealed potential for improvement. Analysis of 
epidemiological data has shown that 50% and 70% of the population burden caused by any 
anxiety disorder, and GAD respectively, could be avoided with better care (Andrews, Issakidis, 
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Sanderson, Corry, & Lapsley, 2004).  Furthermore, there is evidence that appropriately selected 
and implemented treatments can improve the quality of life and long-term outcomes of patients 
diagnosed with anxiety disorders (Mendlowicz & Stein, 2014).  
A solution to the problem of current psychiatric diagnosis would be to have available 
neurally-grounded biomarkers for distinct mental disorders. In efforts to enhance diagnosis and 
subsequent treatment of mental disorders, the US National Institute of Mental Health has 
established the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project. In a recent report, they stated “Our 
expectation…is that identifying syndromes based on pathophysiology will eventually be able 
to improve outcomes” (Insel et al., 2010). Such an approach will require a unified and 
collaborative effort between clinicians and researchers. Nonetheless, it holds significant 
promise to alleviate at least some of the distress and burden currently caused by anxiety 
disorders.  
Preclinical Neuropsychology: A Potential Solution 
 Preclinical neuropsychology research has the potential to address the limitations 
associated with the current diagnostic systems (i.e. DSM-5 and ICD-10) that assign a ‘loose’ 
anxiety label to a diverse array of superficial symptom presentations.  Although confusion 
exists among clinicians surrounding the separation of ‘anxiety’ from ‘fear’, the 
pharmacological evidence appears clear cut. There are currently two types of drugs prescribed 
to treat DSM-5 Anxiety Disorders: anxiolytics and panicolytics. Anxiolytic drugs, as a class, 
reduce some instances of anxiety (e.g. GAD), however they have no common effect on phobia, 
panic, depression or obsession (McNaughton, 2002). In contrast, panicolytic drugs generally 
alleviate panic, depression and obsession, as well as anxiety (Seddon & Nutt, 2007). Thus, 
there is a division in the therapeutic actions of anxiolytics and panicolytics. This suggests that 
there is a separation in the neural systems underlying the syndromes classified by the general 
DSM-5 ‘Anxiety Disorder’ label. It appears that the neural systems underlying processes of 
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anxiety are pharmacologically distinct from those systems underlying panic, phobia, 
depression and obsession. The identification of neural activity specific to these separate 
underlying systems will aid in the development of distinct biological biomarkers for anxiety 
processes and fear processes, and give rise to a new biologically grounded definition of 
‘anxiety’.  As a result, the current clinician-defined diagnostic systems will be transformed into 
more rational and biologically grounded systems.  
A Neuropsychological Theory of Anxiety and Fear Disorders 
This pharmacological separation between anxiolytic and panicolytic drugs provided the 
framework for Gray and McNaughton (2000)'s initial two dimensional (2D) 
neuropsychological theory of defensive reactions and their disorders, later updated by 
McNaughton and Corr (2004). The fundamental axiom of this theory lies in the definition that 
anxiolytics exert their effects on a Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS; the ‘anxiety’ system) 
but not on a Fight, Flight, Freeze System (FFFS; the ‘fear’ system). Instead, the FFFS is 
sensitive to the therapeutic action of panicolytics.  
There are two dimensions described by this neuropsychological theory; defensive 
direction and defensive distance. Defensive direction categorises ‘fear’ processes and ‘anxiety’ 
processes as dimensional opposites; defensive avoidance and defensive approach, respectively. 
This dimension is a categorical measure where anxiety describes reactions that function to 
enhance defensive approach. In contrast, fear describes reactions that function to enhance 
defensive avoidance. Defensive approach is regulated by the BIS, which is activated under 
situations of goal conflict (i.e. approach-avoidance, approach-approach, and avoidance-
avoidance conflict). Usually, if one goal is activated, a signal is sent to the motor systems, 
which produce an appropriate motor response, and to the hippocampus, which ignores the 
signal. However, if two incompatible goals are activated simultaneously the hippocampus 
detects the goal conflict and activates the BIS. The BIS initially inhibits on-going behaviour 
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and replaces it with risk assessment behaviour. The outputs of the BIS aim to reduce goal 
conflict by increasing arousal and creating an attentional and negative emotional emphasis to 
identify the least aversive goal.  In contrast, defensive avoidance and fear-related behaviours 
are regulated and controlled by the FFFS.  
The other dimension of this theory, defensive distance, relates to the perceived 
immediacy of the threat (i.e. how much time is available to respond to the threat). Specific 
behaviours are hierarchically organised along this dimension, corresponding to the hierarchical 
organisation of underlying neural modules responsible for their control. For example, at the 
smallest defensive distance, activity occurs in the lowest neural level (the periaqueductal grey). 
When defensive distance is at its greatest, activity occurs in the highest neural level (the 
prefrontal cortex). Thus, defensive direction and defensive distance combine to determine the 
nature of behaviour produced at a specific point in time and space. Figure 1.1 presented below 
provides a visual summary of this 2D defence system. 
Health, Morbidity, and Co-morbidity 
An important prediction of this 2D neuropsychological theory is that hyper-activity arising 
within distinct modules will produce distinct symptoms, and hyper-reactivity will produce 
distinct syndromes. Any one of the modules or neural control areas can become active under a 
variety of different conditions. When modules become active, specific behaviours and 
autonomic changes are produced to enhance defensive avoidance or approach. Critically, these 
behavioural and autonomic outputs become maladaptive when the particular context does not 
involve a real threat, or the symptoms are produced in excessive proportion to the magnitude 
of the threat. For example, when a real threat is present (e.g. a grizzly bear), neural activity 
arising in the periaqueductal grey will produce normal adaptive behavioural and autonomic 
changes (i.e. increased cardiac output, increased breathing rate, normal panic). Conversely, in 




 Figure 1.1. The 2D defence system proposed by Gray and McNaughton (2000), and updated by 
McNaughton and Corr (2004). Brain areas are in capitals, normal function of an area is in lower case, 
closest current disorder is in italics. The dimension of defensive direction describes the parallel systems 
of defensive avoidance (i.e. FFFS) presented on the left, and defensive approach (i.e. BIS) presented 
on the right. The BIS is sensitive to all types of anxiolytics, whereas the FFFS is not sensitive to 
anxiolytics but sensitive to panicolytics. The BIS is suggested to control anxiety-related behaviours and 
the FFFS, fear-related behaviours. The BIS relies on brain activity in the theta range to carry out its 
operations. Theta reduction predicts anxiolytic action with no false positives or negatives recorded. The 
second dimension of defensive distance describes the hierarchical organisation of neural areas and 
their corresponding functional output in relation to the perceived immediacy of threat. Neural activity at 
each level of the hierarchy will produce specific behavioural and autonomic output. Hyper-activity of a 
module will lead to the production of symptoms, and hyper-reactivity will lead to the production of a 
syndrome. Extensive reciprocal connections between different modules within the parallel systems may 
account for the co-morbidity of two or more distinct disorders, secondary disorders, or the complex 
presentation of symptoms associated with a primary disorder. Neurotransmitters Noradrenaline (NA) 
and 5-hydroxytryptamine/Serotonin (5HT) regulate both the BIS and FFFS. Neurotransmitter receptor 
distribution and density differs between the two systems, thus accounting for different sensitivities of 
each system to therapeutic drugs. BDZ = benzodiazepine receptors; OCD = obsessive compulsive 
disorder; PAG = periaqueductal grey; PFC = Prefrontal cortex; RSA = Rhythmical Slow Activity. Figure 
taken from McNaughton (2014); Legend taken from McIntosh (2015).  
10	
	
behavioural and autonomic output - but now these are inappropriate and maladaptive for the 
particular context (clinical panic). Additionally, epileptiform discharge in the periaqueductal 
grey and other neural areas can result in the production of spontaneous panic when no danger 
or perception of threat is present at all (Dantendorfer, Amering, et al., 1995; Dantendorfer, 
Windhaber, & Maierhofer, 1995; Deakin, 1998). 
An important prediction arises from the assumption that hyper-reactivity of distinct 
modules leads to distinct syndromes. This prediction is that characteristics of each distinct 
syndrome will be determined by the neural level that is hyper-reactive (i.e. dependent on 
defensive distance) and the defensive system of which the module is a part of (i.e. dependent 
on defensive direction). For example, in the presence of a weak threat (e.g. being introduced to 
an unfamiliar person), hyper-reactivity in the highest level of the defensive approach system 
(i.e. the dorsal stream of prefrontal cortex) may lead to the production of Social Anxiety 
Disorder (SAD). Alternatively, not in the presence of a weak threat but in anticipation of any 
threat (e.g. anticipation of germs), hyper-reactivity in the highest level of the defensive 
avoidance system may produce excessive hand washing consistent with Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD). In sum, hyper-reactivity of the FFFS modules such as the ventro-lateral 
periaqueductal grey, medial hypothalamus, amygdala and frontal cortices may correspond, 
respectively, to a pure panic disorder, simple through complex phobic disorders (i.e. primary 
avoidance), and obsessive compulsive disorders. Similarly, hyper-reactivity of the BIS 
modules such as the medial hypothalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, frontal cortices and 
prefrontal cortices may represent, respectively, focussed anxiety, generalized anxiety, 
agoraphobia and social anxiety. The differential distributions of serotonin 1A (5-HT1A) 
receptors relative to serotonin (5HT) terminals in the parallel systems and at different module 
levels may explain differential therapeutic drug effects. For example, therapeutic effects of 
certain 5HT1A drugs (e.g. buspirone) are more restricted, alleviating cases of GAD but not panic 
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(Seddon & Nutt, 2007). Alternatively, 5HT reuptake inhibitor drugs produce more effects on a 
very wide range of 5HT receptors, alleviating both anxiety and panic. 
McNaughton and Corr (2004)'s 2D theory additionally provides an explanation for the 
occurrence of co-morbid disorders and the production of secondary disorders. Hyper-reactivity 
may separately arise in different modules and therefore produce distinct co-morbid syndromes 
with unique underlying aetiologies. In contrast, neural activity arising in one specific module 
can directly, or indirectly, influence the neural activity in a different module through the 
presence of bidirectional reciprocal connections between modules of the parallel systems. 
Consequently, secondary symptoms and syndromes may arise in a normal module due to 
abnormal inputs from a hyper-reactive syndromal module. Over time, processes of learning 
and environmental feedback can reinforce and strengthen connections between modules 
accounting for the development of a secondary disorder. For example, Agoraphobia (i.e. 
anxiety) may develop in people who suffer from panic, via conditioning of the BIS, particularly 
if they are neurotic (Andrews, Stewart, Morris-Yates, Holt, & Henderson, 1990). 
This development from primary morbidity in the FFFS to additional BIS-activation 
symptoms is outlined in Figure 1.2 (McNaughton & Corr, 2016). Pure 
physiological/neurological panic first arises from pathological activity or reactivity in the PAG. 
This may cause neural activation in other modules of the FFFS, such as the amygdala, resulting 
in increased arousal. An individual may then come to associate the initial panic attack with the 
situation it originally occurred in (e.g. a crowded space, social situation). This conditioned 
anxiety develops as a result of activation of the BIS via reciprocal connections with the FFFS. 
Conditioned anxiety further increases the individual’s arousal and, consequently, may trigger 
subsequent panic attacks in mildly threatening situations, thus creating a vicious negative cycle. 
To cope with conditioned anxiety, the individual may develop a pattern of maladaptive 




Figure 1.2. Symptomatic comorbid anxiety with panic as a syndrome. Spontaneous activity (or hyper-
reactivity) of the periaqueductal grey arises in lower levels of the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS; 
bottom left). This generates pathological panic attacks. Active avoidance and arousal are increased 
through ascending neural connections of the FFFS (solid outline filled gray arrows, width indicates 
degree of activation, simple black double headed arrows show available connections). The occurrence 
of a panic attack in a distinctive and threatening environmental situation may occur, and result in the 
learning of anticipatory anxiety, particularly in neurotic individuals (dashed outline filled gray arrow). 
This conditioning is mediated by the hippocampus and amygdala, and the normal spread of neural 
activity through the behavioural inhibition system (BIS). The overall result is abnormal panic producing 
normal levels of fear and anxiety given the level of perceived threat generated by the panic. This implies 
that a treatment such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy may improve anxiety, and some panic, while 
leaving a primary, neurological, incidence of panic intact. Figure taken and legend adapted from 
McNaughton and Corr (2016).  
 
the clinic with a diagnosis of Agoraphobia with panic. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
targeting avoidance behaviour and catastrophic misinterpretations of panic symptoms will 
likely break the negative cycle that has developed, and consequently improve functioning. 
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However, the primary morbidity (i.e. hyper-reactivity of the PAG) will remain and continue to 
give rise to a low level of residual panic attacks (McNaughton & Corr, 2016). 
This symptomatic development can also occur in the opposite direction, with primary 
morbidity in the BIS generating associated FFFS-activation symptoms (McNaughton & Corr, 
2016). As outlined in Figure 1.3, hyper-reactivity within modules of the BIS will cause high 
levels of general arousal presenting as Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Increased general 
arousal, in turn, may precipitate the occurrence of panic attacks, especially in individuals who 
have a lower stimulus input threshold for PAG activation. Consequently these panic attacks, 
precipitated by high general arousal, may further increase original BIS anxiety through 
processes of learning and conditioning. In turn, this will further increase general arousal and 
lead to higher frequency of panic attacks. Critically, treatments targeting general anxiety will 
likely reduce general arousal, and the consequent occurrence of panic attacks. 
Separating ‘Anxiety Disorders’ from ‘Fear Disorders’ 
Based on defensive direction, McNaughton and Corr (2004) proposed a separation between 
disorders of ‘fear’ from disorders of ‘anxiety’. Fear related behaviours correspond to defensive 
avoidance, and anxiety related behaviours to defensive approach. Accordingly, McNaughton 
and Corr (2004) describe DSM-5 Specific Phobia (SP), Panic Disorder (with/without 
Agoraphobia), and OCD as disorders of defensive avoidance (i.e. ‘fear’ disorders). All three 
disorders are sensitive to panicolytics but not anxiolytics and therefore are predicted to be 
associated with dysfunction of the FFFS. In contrast, Agoraphobia, SAD, and GAD are 
described as disorders of defensive approach (i.e. ‘anxiety’ disorders). These disorders are at 
least partially sensitive to the therapeutic actions of anxiolytics and therefore are by definition 
associated with dysfunction of the BIS. Despite some variation in the sensitivity to anxiolytics 






Figure 1.3. Anxiety as a syndrome with symptomatic comorbid panic. Spontaneous activity (or hyper-
reactivity) of the hippocampus, amygdala, or both, occurs in upper levels of the behavioural inhibition 
system (BIS; top right) and generates pathological generalised anxiety. Other types of anxiety increase 
through descending neural connections (solid outline filled grey arrows) and also ascending 
connections (not shown) of the BIS. As a result, general peripheral arousal increases (e.g. adrenaline 
levels) resulting in the activation of the periaqueductal grey (dashed outline filled grey arrow) leading to 
the occurrence of panic attacks. This occurs particularly in individuals who display a predisposition to 
panic. Additionally, neural activity also spreads throughout the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS) via 
descending and ascending connections. The overall result is that abnormal anxiety generates 
symptoms of panic and fear that are normal given the level of perceived anticipatory threat generated 
by the pathological anxiety. Figure taken and legend adapted from McNaughton and Corr (2016).  
 
The link between hyper-reactivity of modules - or of their regulatory systems – to 
specific syndromes may provide the key to developing the first neurologically grounded 
biomarker for any mental disorder (McNaughton & Corr, 2016). Identifying hyper-reactivity 
in particular neural modules or systems controlling the BIS and/or the FFFS will detect specific 
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patients who share a common underlying neural dysfunction for their symptoms. These patients 
may consequently respond to the same treatment protocols. Even in the absence of symptoms, 
individuals who have hyper-reactive modules will elicit greater than expected levels of output 
in response to a particular stimulus input.  In other words, these individuals will produce a 
normal level of output following a sub-normal input stimulus, or an excessive level of output 
in response to a normal input stimulus. Critically, measuring the level of output from a module 
in response to a set stimulus input will detect those patients with hyper-reactive modules. 
Developing a method of assessing hyper-reactivity of the regulatory systems controlling the 
BIS and the FFFS will provide objective neural biomarkers for disorders of defensive approach 
(i.e. ‘anxiety’ disorders) and disorders of defensive avoidance (i.e. ‘fear’ disorders), 
respectively. Additionally, individuals with distinct co-morbid disorders will be more easily 
identified by detecting hyper-reactivity in more than one distinct module (McNaughton & Corr, 
2016).  
Development of an Anxiety-Specific Biomarker 
Investigating the therapeutic action of anxiolytics on neural activity, relative to 
panicolytics and other drug classes, may provide one method of identifying an anxiety-specific 
biomarker (McNaughton, 2014). Critically, there are no ‘magic bullet’ drugs that produce a 
limited specific therapeutic effect. Instead, every drug produces a main effect and multiple side 
effects. When looking at the effects of a single drug, there is no way of disentangling its main 
therapeutic effect from the range of side effects it also produces. However, when comparing 
the actions of drugs against each other, any effects that are shared across a class of drugs must 
be a main effect and those not shared are non-specific side effects. For example, anxiolytic 
drugs acting at 5HT1A receptors, GABAA receptors, or voltage gated calcium channels, 
individually produce a range of effects on panic, muscle relaxation, depression, addiction, 
insomnia and epilepsy.  However, as their name suggests, their only common shared action as 
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a class is alleviation of generalised anxiety (Baldwin, Ajel, Masdrakis, Nowak, & Rafiq, 2013; 
McNaughton, Kocsis, & Hajos, 2007). As seen in Table 1.1, both classical (i.e. 
benzodiazepines) and novel (i.e. buspirone, pregabalin) anxiolytics share an overlapping 
anxiety reducing effect; therefore this is their main effect. Any alteration of neural activity, 
cognitions, or behaviour that anxiolytics as a class produce, consequently, must be related to 
anxiety.  Such shared changes cannot be related to panic because buspirone has no therapeutic 
effect on panic. Likewise, pregabalin is not antidepressant. Critically, neural activity that is 
changed by all anxiolytics may provide a biological biomarker for BIS regulation and a means 
of detecting potential hyper-reactivity underlying one distinct anxiety syndrome (Corr & 
McNaughton, 2016; McNaughton, 2014). 
Using this logic, we have recently developed a neural biomarker for BIS reactivity. In 
rat hippocampi, the frequency of Rhythmical Slow Activity (RSA, 4-12Hz) is reliably reduced 
by all known anxiolytics – e.g. barbiturates, benzodiazepines, 5HT1A receptor agonists, calcium 
channel blockers, and Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (McNaughton et al., 2007; Siok, 
Taylor, & Hajós, 2009). Importantly, antipsychotic or sedative drugs (e.g. haloperidol, 
chlorpromazine), that do not reduce anxiety, do not reduce the frequency of RSA (McNaughton 
et al., 2007). A reduction in RSA frequency has predicted clinical anxiolytic action with 100% 
success over many decades of testing. According to these findings, as summarised by 
McNaughton and Corr (2004), anxiolytics produce their anxiety alleviating effects by acting 
on the BIS, which carries out its functional operations through theta activity (4-12Hz). Thus, 
rodent RSA elicited by reticular stimulation may be the first ever neurologically grounded 
biomarker for one anxiety specific process. This is supported by the finding that when blocked 
RSA is replaced with artificial brain rhythms, behavioural dysfunction is restored 
(McNaughton, Ruan, & Woodnorth, 2006). 
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Table 1.1. Relative effectiveness of drugs used to treat anxiety and depressive disorders. No drug has 
a single therapeutic effect on one disorder. BDZ1 (Classical benzodiazepines), BDZ2 (Novel 
benzodiazepines), BUS (Buspirone and related 5HT-1A agonists), and PGB (Pregabalin, calcium 
channel blockers) share only a common anxiolytic effect on Generalised Anxiety and Social Anxiety. As 
a class, they produce no shared effect on panic, phobia, obsession, or depression. These ‘anxiolytic’ 
drugs all reduce the frequency of elicited theta. The observed variation in therapeutic action of drugs 
between different disorders can be attributed to variation in receptor density location within different 
brain areas. This variation in relative drug effectiveness suggests separation in the neural control of 
these disorders. IMI (Imipramine and other tricyclic antidepressants excluding clomipramine); CMI 
(Clomipramine); MAOI (Monoamine oxidase inhibitors); SSRI (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors). 
Table and text constructed based on information taken from McNaughton (2002), McNaughton (2014) 
and Corr and McNaughton (2016). 
 
        
BDZ1 0 - 0 0 0 0 - - 
BDZ2 - - 0 - ?  ( )  
BUS 0 - ( ) - ? ? ( ) - 
IMI - - ( ) - ( ) 0 0 - 
CMI -- - -- - ? ? ( ) (?) 
MAOI - ? ( ) - - (-) - (-) 
SSRI - - -- - ? (-) - - 















































































Based on this rat finding, a human anxiety specific biomarker was further developed - 
providing the very first human biomarker for an anxiolytic-specific process. As goal conflict 
activates the BIS (McNaughton & Corr, 2004), we attempted to elicit neural activity related to 
BIS activation during a task that involves situations of goal conflict, the Stop Signal Task 
(SST). Due to ethical considerations, hippocampal depth recording of neural activity, as used 
in rodent experiments, was not feasible for measuring neural activity in humans. Instead, an 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) method was used to record superficial frontal brain activity 
predicted to be entrained by hippocampal activity arising from deep within the brain (Young 
& McNaughton, 2009). It was predicted that the detection of neural activity arising from the 
hippocampus during situations of goal conflict would represent the functional output of the BIS 
when activated. 
In this SST task, participants were exposed to situations of approach, avoidance, and 
approach-avoidance conflict. Neural activity representing BIS activation (i.e. Goal Conflict 
Specific Rhythmicity, GCSR) was measured by subtracting the average EEG power recorded 
during periods of approach and avoidance from periods of approach-avoidance conflict. 
Interestingly, situations of approach-avoidance goal conflict were found to elicit right frontal 
(F8) brain activity in the 5-12 Hz frequency range (i.e. GCSR, Neo, Thurlow, & McNaughton, 
2011). This GCSR was positively linked to measures of Spielberger’s Trait Anxiety 
(Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983) and Eysenck’s Neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991). 
Critically,  it was reduced by a range of anxiolytics (pregabalin, benzodiazepines, and 5HT1A 
drugs) that share only a common anxiety alleviating effect but no intersecting effect on 
depression or panic (McNaughton, Swart, Neo, Bates, & Glue, 2013; Shadli, Glue, McIntosh, 
& McNaughton, 2015). These findings suggest GCSR, detected during the SST, represents 
neural activity associated with BIS activation. 
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Although administration of anxiolytics immediately reduces RSA in rats (McNaughton 
et al., 2007) and GCSR in humans (Neo et al., 2011), it takes several weeks for full anxiety-
alleviating therapeutic benefits of anxiolytics to be obtained. This observation suggests the BIS 
may support an anxiety-specific process contributing to the onset and maintenance of an 
anxiety syndrome. Critically, chronic hyper-reactivity of the BIS may result in dysfunctional 
regulation of this anxiety-specific process resulting in clinical anxiety. Thus, high GCSR may 
act as a biomarker indicating dysfunctional hyper-reactivity of the BIS, predictive of one type 
of clinical anxiety syndrome.   
GCSR would be the very first way of identifying a sub-group of neurally distinct 
‘anxiety disorder’ patients whose psychological symptoms arise from BIS hyper-reactivity, as 
opposed to other underlying dysfunctions. McNaughton (2014) predicted that individuals with 
hyper-reactive BISs would yield high GCSR scores relative to those with normally functioning 
BISs. Thus, high GCSR will reflect one type of neural dysfunction underlying one specific 
anxiety syndrome. Identifying this organic cause for symptom manifestations will allow better 
prediction of treatment response. Reductions in GCSR predict anxiolytic action therefore it is 
expected that individuals with a hyper-reactive BIS – and who, therefore, produce strong GCSR 
– may benefit from anxiolytic drug treatment. Critically, clinical validation and translation of 
this biomarker for BIS hyper-reactivity is the first step in the long process of transforming and 
enhancing the current systems of mental disorder diagnosis.  
The present study: towards clinical validation of an anxiety process biomarker 
Research to date has focused on the investigation of GCSR within a ‘healthy’ 
population of individuals recruited through the Student Job Search Organisation (McIntosh, 
2015; McNaughton et al., 2013; Neo et al., 2011; Shadli et al., 2015). Based on these findings, 
GCSR correlates with personality measures such as Neuroticism and Trait Anxiety (Neo et al., 
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2011; Shadli et al., 2015), is sensitive to the action of anxiolytic drugs (McNaughton et al., 
2013; Shadli et al., 2015), and holds promise as the first ever biological biomarker for one 
anxiety specific process. Importantly, GCSR has not yet been validated within a patient sample 
of individuals diagnosed with anxiety disorders. Such validation is required to further develop 
GCSR as a biologically grounded biomarker for one type of anxiety. We aimed to take the first 
steps in the clinical validation of GCSR within a sample of ‘anxiety disorder’ patients.  
According to this aim, we recruited a sample of patients who presented with a DSM-5 
Anxiety Disorder, and reported not currently receiving pharmacological treatment. A sample 
of control participants, who did not explicitly report experiencing anxiety, were also recruited 
via Student Job Search (SJS) to allow comparison. The patient sample underwent a diagnostic 
assessment to determine their appropriate DSM-5 diagnosis. All participants then completed a 
combination of personality questionnaires using a computer delivery system and had their EEG 
recorded in the Stop Signal Task (SST) that we previously developed. GCSR was measured 
for all participants and statistical analyses performed to determine if GCSR was higher within 
the sample of patients with DSM-5 anxiety disorders compared to the SJS control sample. It 
was predicted that DSM-5 ‘anxiety disorder’ patients on average would show higher GCSR 
than control participants. 
Early in this study, it was discovered that the rate of patient recruitment was lower than 
anticipated. Preliminary analyses were therefore conducted on the large group of participants 
recruited from Student Job Search (SJS). Using a high STAI-T score as a proxy for anxiety 
disorder, we compared GCSR obtained from nominally ‘anxious’ SJS participants with high 
STAI-T scores against matched nominally ‘non-anxious’ SJS participants with low STAI-T 
scores. We then assessed whether GCSR differences generalised across recruitment methods 
to the small sample of patient participants with a DSM-5 anxiety disorder diagnosis who 
explicitly reported experiencing symptoms of panic, fear, and anxiety. This study design 
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attempts to compensate both for the small number of patients and for the lack of an 
appropriately matched ‘healthy’ control group for the anxiety disorder patient sample. The 
logic involves two steps. First, a comparison of matched high and low STAI-T groups, where 
any differences can be attributed to STAI-T. Second, a comparison of the high and low STAI-
T groups, separately, with a patient group who report particularly high STAI-T scores. If the 
patients have similar, or more extreme, GCSR to the high STAI group, their difference can be 




Chapter 2: General Methods 
All data presented in this thesis were collected by two experimenters (me and Shabah Shadli) 
as part of an ongoing larger project investigating the clinical translation of a biomarker for one 
type of anxiety specific process. Shabah Shadli collected the EEG data obtained from the 
patient sample, and I collected the majority of the EEG data obtained from the Student Job 
Search (SJS) participant sample. The present study specifically investigated the relationship 
between DSM-5 anxiety disorders, as a whole, and GCSR – our proposed anxiety biomarker. 
The following details relating to the Stop Signal Task (SST), EEG recording, ECG recording 
(data not reported), questionnaire administration, and data analysis were identical for both 
patient and SJS participants tested by the two experimenters, except where specified. The 
diagnostic DSM-5 Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) was administered 
only to participants in the patient group by two clinical psychology trainees (me and Lisa 
Labuschagne), who had received instruction from a psychiatrist (Professor Paul Glue).  
Participants 
Two groups of participants were recruited for this study: participants recruited through Student 
Job Search and patients. The SJS participant group consisted of 26 males and 60 females aged 
18 to 37 years (mean = 21.9 years).  The patient participant group consisted of 7 males and 14 
females aged 18 to 48 years (mean = 30.2 years). 
The large sample of participants were recruited from the University of Otago through 
the Student Job Search organisation and reported no major illness in the previous 30 days, no 
regular use of psychotropic medication in the past six months and no alcohol consumption in 
the 24 hours prior to the experiment. Additionally, none had received any medical or 
psychological treatment for depression, anxiety or other emotional disorder within the previous 
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12 months. No information was collected specifically about their current or previous 
experience of clinical anxiety. 
The patient participants were recruited in a variety of ways including newspaper 
advertisements (See Appendix A), supermarket advertisements (See Appendix B), online 
internet advertisements (See Appendix C), and in response to newspaper and magazine articles 
reporting on the larger research project (these articles included an invitation to people with 
symptoms of anxiety, panic and fear to participate; see Appendix D). All patient participants 
reported suffering from ongoing symptoms of anxiety, fear, or panic but were not currently 
receiving medication treatment for their anxiety disorder. The patient sample consisted of 
individuals whose primary disorder(s) met the diagnostic criteria for pure Social Anxiety 
Disorder (n = 4), pure Generalised Anxiety Disorder (n = 5), pure Panic Disorder (n = 1), co-
morbid Social Anxiety Disorder and Agoraphobia (n = 1), co-morbid Social Anxiety Disorder, 
Panic Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder (n = 2), co-morbid Panic Disorder and 
Agoraphobia (n = 1), co-morbid Panic Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder (n = 1), co-
morbid Social Anxiety Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder (n = 2), co-morbid 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder and Alcohol Dependence (n = 1), co-morbid Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (n = 1), and co-morbid 
Panic Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (n = 2). It was important to test patients in 
the absence of anxiolytic treatment as we have found that anxiolytic drugs affect the strength 
of the GCSR signal obtained (Shadli et al., 2015). Initiation of psychological treatment was not 
an exclusion criterion.  Otherwise, patients were healthy and did not report any major illness 
in the previous 30 days. Patients reported no regular use of psychotropic medication in the 
previous six months, or alcohol consumption in the previous 24 hours before participating in 
this experiment.  
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All SJS participants received monetary compensation ($15 per hour) for the time and 
effort spent in undertaking the experiment. All patient participants received petrol vouchers as 
reimbursement for the time and effort spent in undertaking the experiment ($20 per hour). No 
monetary reward or punishment was received in the experimental tasks. Only right handed SJS 
participants were recruited for this study as the sample of potential participants through SJS 
was large enough to exclude left-handed participants. This was important because previous 
experiments revealed that the GCSR effect was lateralized to right frontal areas of the human 
brain. Both left and right-handed patient participants were recruited (left n = 3, right n = 17). 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the University of Otago Ethics Committee 
(approval number: H15/005). All participants provided informed consent prior to undergoing 
testing (See Appendix E for information and consent forms).  
Apparatus/Materials 
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview  
The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) English version 6.0.0 (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) was administered to all participants in the patient group by a 
clinical psychology trainee. The interviewer never acted as the experimenter for the same 
participant. The MINI is a brief structured interview used to aid in the diagnosis of major Axis 
I psychiatric disorders outlined by the DSM-IV and ICD-10. It comprises a series of precise 
closed questions that require the patient to respond with a yes or no answer. Questions in the 
MINI are relevant to the following 15 diagnostic categories: Major Depressive Episode, 
Suicidality, Manic and Hypomanic Episodes, Panic Disorder, Agoraphobia, Social Phobia 
(Social Anxiety Disorder), Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 
Alcohol Dependence/Abuse, Substance Dependence/Abuse (Non-Alcohol), Psychotic 
Disorders and Mood Disorder with Psychotic Features, Anorexia Nervosa, Bulimia Nervosa, 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Antisocial Personality Disorder. Patients in this study were 
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asked questions relevant to all diagnostic domains. The MINI was conducted in a quiet private 
room with the patient seated in a chair.   
Task Presentation and Recording of Participant Responses 
The SST and a questionnaire delivery program were presented on PC computers with a monitor 
size of 360mm x 375mm. Participants were seated in an office chair in front of the computer 
screen, which was located at eye level, approximately 135cm away from their face. In the 
experimental task, participants responded to stimuli using a standard computer mouse. Right-
handed participants used their right index finger and right second finger to make appropriate 
left and right mouse clicks, respectively. Left-handed participants used their left index finger 
and left second finger to make appropriate right and left mouse clicks respectively. The 
presentations of stimuli, recording of responses and other aspects of the SST task, and also 
questionnaire delivery programs, were performed using purpose-built programmes written in 
Visual Basic 6.  
Questionnaires/Demographic data 
Participant responses to a variety of personality questionnaire items were recorded for the 
purpose of the main study investigating the relationship of current personality measures with 
GCSR. These are not reported in this thesis except for aggregate scores on the Spielberger 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983), Eysenck’s Neuroticism scale 
score (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991), and Anxiousness and Depressiveness scores from the 
Personality Inventory of the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).   
All participants were presented with a computer-delivered questionnaire program 
identical to that developed and used by McIntosh (2015). This questionnaire program was 
delivered to each participant in two sections: Part 1 prior to the SST and Part 2 following the 
SST (See Appendix F for Part 1 of the questionnaire, and Appendix G for Part 2 of the 
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questionnaire). Part 1 of the questionnaire program presented the Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory Y-form (Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983) Trait Anxiety scale items (i.e. 
excluding the State scale), the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-R, Eysenck 
& Eysenck, 1991) Extroversion and Neuroticism scale items (i.e. excluding Psychoticism and 
Lie scales), and the Behavioural Activation System/Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS/BAS, 
Carver & White, 1994) BIS scale items (i.e. excluding the BAS scale). Participants responded 
to the EPQ items using a 4-point response scale (No-almost never; No-sometimes; Yes-often; 
Yes-almost always) rather than the conventional 0-1 (No-Yes) scale. This allowed the main 
study to more precisely investigate the relation of individual EPQ items with GCSR. Part 2 of 
the questionnaire presented Depressiveness, Anxiousness, Emotional Lability, Perseveration, 
Separation Insecurity, Withdrawal, Anhedonia, Risk-taking, Intimacy Avoidance and 
Restricted Affectivity scale items from the Personality Inventory of the DSM-5 (PID-5, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). . Additionally, Part 2 also included questions about 
sleep and depression history. The standard Statistics New Zealand format was used to collect 
information about each participant’s gender, age, ethnicity, and handedness. Standard weight 
and height scales were used to measure each participant’s weight and height.  
EEG Recording 
EEG data were collected from each participant by fitting a Waveguard EEG cap (ANT 
Neurotechnology) to their head. There were three sizes of EEG caps: Large (head 
circumference 57-64cm), Medium (53-57cm) and Small (47-53cm). Each participant was fitted 
with the appropriately sized EEG cap according to their head circumference.  EEG recordings 
were made from the scalp surface using Ag/Agcl electrodes within the EEG cap. The electrodes 
were located on the EEG cap in the arrangement of the International 10:20 electrode placement 
system with recordings from 16 channels: F7, F3, Fz, F4, T3, C3, Cz, C4, T4, T5, P3, Pz, P4, 
and T6. The Fp1 electrode was used to detect artefact activity, requiring removal, which was 
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caused by eye-blinks. All electrodes were independent and re-referenced following data 
collection to the average of separate A1 (electrical reference) and A2 mastoid electrodes (also 
located in the cap). A 3ml syringe and Precision Glide 16 gauge blunt needle (Becton, 
Dickenson & Co, New Jersey, USA) was used to insert Electro-gel (Electro Cap International, 
USA) into each electrode recorded from. The EEG cap was connected to the ASA 
Neurotechnology EEG machine, which provided measurements of impedance as well as 
recording EEG. Electrical activity was sampled from the brain at a rate of 256Hz throughout 
recording before being down-sampled to 128 Hz for analysis. Band pass filters were set to 1-
36Hz. All participants underwent EEG recording in a small cubicle (certified body protected 
area for electrical recording) located in the Department of Psychology and the University of 
Otago. 
ECG Recording 
ECG data were collected from each participant by fitting four stick-on electrodes onto both 
arms and legs of each participant. Electrodes used were Ambu White Sensor 0415M ECG 
electrodes (Ambu A/S Baltorpbakken 13 DK-2750 Ballerup, India). These electrodes were then 
connected to an Edan SE-1010 PC-based ECG Machine (Model: SE-1010, Edan USA, 4204 
Jutland Drive, Suite B, San Diego, CA 92117). ECG data are not reported in this thesis. 
Storage of Confidential Participant Data 
Patient participant data were collected and stored in a confidential manner to allow 3- and 6-
month follow-up as part of the main project. Patient EEG data, ECG data, personal details and 
personality questionnaire response data were stored on the computer in a password-protected 
folder. This password-protected folder was only visible on the desktop when a researcher was 
logged on to the computer under the password-protected username. Hard copies of each 
patient’s information consent form, scored MINI form, and participant details were also stored 
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within a folder contained in a locked filing cabinet. Personal identifying details for SJS 
participants were not retained and all of their data was coded only by participant number. 
Stop Signal Task (SST) 
In the present experiment, the SST was derived from an original task used by Aron and 
Poldrack (2006). The ‘C’ code for this original SST was kindly provided by Dr Aron, and 
converted to Visual Basic by Neil McNaughton and used by Neo et al. (2011) in their initial 
study. Four modifications were made to the original task for its use in Shadli et al. (2015) and 
the current study: (1) Using a similar method to Carter et al. (2003),	short and long Stop Signal 
Delays (SSDs) were generated as a proportion of the ongoing average Go reaction time of each 
participant. However, intermediate SSDs were derived by tracking to 50% of participant 
responding, as in the original task. This modification was made to promote optimal statistical 
analysis following data collection by allowing SSD types to be easily separated into equal-
sized non-overlapping short, intermediate, and long groups. (2) Following a response on each 
trial, participants received feedback (i.e. presentation of smiley face for successful trial 
responses, and frowney face for unsuccessful trial responses). (3) Colour was added to the Go 
stimulus to increase its discrimination. (4) To prevent strategic slowing of Go responses, 
feedback was provided if a participant’s Go response was substantially slower than their Go 
reaction time obtained during the initial phase of Go testing (i.e. 1.5 times average pure Go 
reaction time).  Components of the current SST are summarised in Figure 2.1 and described 
below.  
Go Trials 
 At the beginning of each Go trial, a white fixation circle was presented at the centre of 
the monitor screen against a black background. After 500ms, the white Go stimulus appeared 
within the fixation circle. The Go stimulus was an arrow symbol that pointed towards the left 
(<) or the right (>). Participants were required to respond to the Go stimulus by performing a 
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right mouse click if the Go stimulus pointed towards the right, or a left mouse click if the 
stimulus pointed toward the left. If the participant made a response click, or following 1000ms 
if no click was performed, the white fixation circle and Go stimulus disappeared from the 
screen. If the participant’s response was correct (e.g. left click response to left pointing arrow 
or right click response to right pointing arrow), a smiley face appeared on screen 500ms 
following their correct response. In contrast, if an incorrect response was made (e.g. opposite 
click response to direction of arrow, or no click response made), a frowney face appeared on 
screen 500ms after a participant’s incorrect response. Each trial was presented 1000ms 
following the presentation of the previous trial. All participants were instructed to respond as 
fast and accurately as possible. Furthermore, they were encouraged to remain still and try their 
hardest not to make head or neck movements throughout the task, except for during the rest 
periods. 
Stop Trials 
The Stop trials in this SST were identical to the Go trials, with the exception that a 1000Hz 
auditory tone (Stop signal) was presented following a delay of variable length (Stop Signal  
Delay, SSD) since the Go stimulus appeared. The auditory tone sounded until a click response 
was made, or for 500ms if no click response was made.  The Stop tone signalled the participant 
to withhold their click response. 
Participants were informed that both going and stopping were equally important and 
that the program was designed so it was not possible for them to successfully withhold their 
click response on every Stop trial, but they should try their best. If the participant successfully 
inhibited their response after hearing the auditory tone, a smiley face was presented for 500ms. 
In contrast, if the participant did not successfully inhibit their response, a frowney face was 




Figure 2.1. A summary of the Stop Signal Task. On both Go and Stop trials, a white fixation circle is 
first presented against a black background on the screen.  Then, in the centre of the circle, a Go stimulus 
(arrow-like symbol pointing to the left or right) is presented. Participants are instructed to respond as 
fast and accurately as possible to the Go stimulus by performing a left/right mouse click according to 
the direction of the Go symbol. A smiley face is presented for correct responses, and a frowney face 
for incorrect responses.  On Stop trials, an auditory Stop signal is presented after a variable delay since 
the Go stimulus and signals the participant to inhibit their response. Following successful response 
inhibitions, a smiley face is presented. Following unsuccessful inhibitions, a frowney face is presented. 
The pre-trial black screen reappears 1500ms following the presentation of the Go stimulus in the 















































Phases of Testing 
Initial Block of Go Trials 
In this initial block of testing, 30 Go trials were presented without Stop trials. This was a 
primary Choice Reaction Time (CRT) task similar to that used by Carter et al. (2003), but 
differing in the number of trials presented. No feedback pertaining to the participant’s Go 
reaction time was given during this phase. Otherwise, all components of the Go trials presented 
in this phase were identical to Go trials presented later in the SST. The major purpose of this 
initial phase of testing was to record participant response measurements required to generate 
the Go Mean Reaction Time (MRT). The Go MRT, in turn, was used to calculate initial lengths 
of SSDs and the maximum Go reaction time (which determined whether feedback was 
presented to the participant to speed up their responding).  
The Stop Task 
The Stop task was similar to the primary CRT but included both Go trials and Stop trials. In 
the current SST, there were a total of 396 trials. Participants completed three blocks of 132 
trials and experienced a rest break (minimum 1 minute - maximum 2 minutes) in between each 
block of trials. Each block of 132 trials contained 33 Stop trials and 99 Go trials. The Stop trials 
in this task were grouped into three types based on the length of the SSD (i.e. short, 
intermediate, and long). Each one of these SSD trial types was presented in a counterbalanced 
order within each block of three Stop trials. Each Stop trial was presented pseudo-randomly 
every four trials in the same sequence for all participants. There were no differences between 
blocks of the SST other than the time elapsed since the start of the SST.  
 In the SST phase, participant instructions and other important task details were similar 
to Neo et al. (2011). Participants were re-presented with the instructions three times throughout 
the SST (at the start of each block). Participants who strategically slowed their Go response to 
increase the likelihood of successfully inhibiting their response received feedback instructing 
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them to speed up their response in the future. If a participant made their response before the 
Go stimulus was presented (on both Go and Stop trials), the trial was removed prior to data 
analysis.  
Control of Stop Signal Delay Length 
The only difference between Stop and Go trials was the presentation of an auditory Stop signal 
after a delay period of variable length since the Go stimulus in Stop trials. To promote optimal 
statistical analysis, the control of SSDs differed in the present SST to Neo et al. (2011) but was 
identical to that used by Shadli et al. (2015) .  
 In the current SST, three distinct nominal staircases generated short, medium and long 
SSDs. Short SSDs were set to 20% of the average Go reaction time recorded from the previous 
16 Go trials presented. Similarly, long SSDs were set to 70% of the average Go reaction time 
recorded from the previous 16 Go trials. Medium SSDs, however, were set initially to 45% of 
the average Go reaction time recorded from the previous 16 Go trials, but then tracked 
participant responding by decreasing one step following unsuccessful participant inhibitions, 
and increasing one step following successful inhibitions. This tracking of intermediate SSDs 
was similar to Aron and Poldrack (2006) and Neo et al. (2011) but the present SST used 30ms 
tracking steps instead of the original 50ms steps. 
 The average Go reaction time calculated from the initial CRT phase was used in block 
1 to generate the SSDs. However, in blocks 2 and 3, initial SSD values were set to the 
appropriate proportion of the average Go reaction time obtained from the last 16 trials of the 
previous block. There was a restriction placed on medium SSDs from taking on a value within 
50ms of the values of either long or short SSDs. We expected that the stair-casing system used 
to generate intermediate SSDs would track to 50% successful participant inhibitions. This was 
33	
	
desired because the BIS theory predicts that when approach-avoidance is balanced (i.e. 50% 
successful inhibition), maximal goal conflict will be produced which activates the BIS.  
Procedure 
The outline of the general procedure is presented in Figure 2.2. Information sheets 
outlining the details and procedure of the experiment were provided to all participants before 
they attended the experimental session. Participants were given the opportunity to ask questions 
about the experiment before their session (i.e. through email) or after they arrived for their 
session. Informed consent was obtained from each participant at the start of the experiment, 
before testing began.   
	
Figure 2.2. General outline of the experimental procedure. 
 
Patient participants were first administered the MINI diagnostic interview whereas SJS 
participants were not. The experimenter then measured the circumference of each participant’s 
head and marked Fp1 and Fp2 according to the International 10:20 system on their forehead 
using a blue marker. The weight and height of each participant was obtained before they were 
taken to the computer to complete Part 1 of the computer-delivered questionnaire program 
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(EPQ-R; Extroversion and Neuroticism: BIS/BAS; BIS: and STAI-Trait; Trait Anxiety). 
Participants were encouraged to continuously work through each question and not remain on 
any one item for too long. The time taken to complete Part 1 of the questionnaire program was 
around 10 minutes. 
After completing Part 1 of the questionnaire, participants were guided to the certified 
body protected area for electrical recording room. While the participant sat in the seat, the 
experimenter selected and fitted the appropriately sized EEG cap to their head. The 
experimenter then attempted to reduce the impedance between the electrode and the 
participant’s scalp. This was achieved by injecting electrode gel into each electrode, and using 
the tip of the blunt needle to gently abrade the scalp and increase the conductance of the 
electrode to optimise electrical recordings. After the impedance of each electrode was reduced 
sufficiently (to below 5KΩ), the EEG cap was connected to the ASA Neurotechnology EEG 
machine. The time taken to fit the EEG cap and sufficiently reduce the impedance was about 
20-40 minutes.  
Before EEG recording started, the experimenter performed two tests on the participants 
to determine whether the EEG recording system was recording clear brain activity. The first 
test was of alpha rhythm and was conducted by instructing each participant to close their eyes 
and relax for ten seconds. The second test was of eye-blink artefact and was conducted by 
instructing each participant to blink once per second for a ten-second period.  The noise level 
of the EEG electrical recording on the monitoring screen during these two tests was assessed 
by the experimenter. If the experimenter judged the EEG quality to be insufficient, further 
attempts were made to reduce electrode impedance. If the EEG quality was judged sufficient, 
behavioural testing began.   
35	
	
The experimenter verbally provided task instructions before the SST commenced (these 
were the same as the visual instructions presented below). The experimenter informed each 
participant that it was impossible to successfully withhold their response on every Stop trial. 
Before the SST began, participants were presented with the following instructions on the 
monitor screen.  
“Remember to respond as FAST as you can once you see the arrow. Press the left mouse button 
if you see the left arrow " < ". Press the right button if you see the right arrow " > ".  However, 
if you hear a beep, your task is to stop yourself from pressing a button.  Stopping and Going 
are equally important”. 
Then, the experimenter left the room and the participant began the SST when they were 
ready. The experimenter was present in the next-door room and available if the participant 
required help at any time. The time taken to complete the SST was about 30 minutes.  
Following completion of the SST, the experimenter applied one ECG electrode to each 
participant’s arms and legs (i.e. 4 electrodes in total). Then, an alpha asymmetry test was 
conducted. Participants were instructed to relax, while opening and closing their eyes for one 
minute intervals over a ten minute period. During this period, the resting electrical brain 
activity and heart rate was recorded for each participant. (Data obtained from this test are not 
reported in this thesis.) The time taken to complete the alpha asymmetry test and ECG 
recording was 10 minutes. 
Following the alpha asymmetry test, the experimenter disconnected the EEG cap from 
the machine and removed it from the participant’s head. Skin cleansing wipes (Briemarpak, 
Australia) were used to remove all pen markings from the participants’ face and scalp. Towels 
were used to remove electrode gel from the participant’ hair and face. ECG electrodes were 
also removed from each participant’s arms and legs. Participants were then asked to complete 
Part 2 of the computer-delivered questionnaire program (i.e. sleep questions, depression 
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history, and PID-5 items). The time taken to complete Part 2 of the questionnaire was about 10 
minutes. At the end of the experimental session, SJS participants signed for their monetary 
reimbursement of $15 per hour and patient participants signed for their petrol vouchers ($20 
per hour).  
Data Processing and Analysis 
Behavioural Data 
The following measures were recorded from each trial of the SST: trial and block number, trial 
type (Go or Stop), SSD value, reaction time, staircase index (1-3), staircase moves for each 
staircase and left/right/null responses. Three summary behavioural measures were calculated: 
(1) average Go Reaction Time (Go RT) across all Go trials (ms); (2) average SSD for the 
middle staircase (ms); and (3) Stop-Signal Reaction Time (SSRT, ms). The Stop Signal 
Reaction Time was calculated by subtracting the mean SSD on the intermediate staircase from 
the median go reaction time, according to the Horse Race Model outlined by Logan and Cowan 
(1984).   
EEG Artefact Removal 
All EEG data was processed using a purpose built program made in Visual Basic 6 by Neil 
McNaughton. Artefact contained in the EEG recordings was removed in three separate stages. 
First, to eliminate residual high frequency noise (including electrical signals at 50Hz) from the 
EEG traces, a simple three point running mean (providing a cut-off at 43 Hz) acted as a low 
pass filter. Secondly, artefact caused by eye-blinks was removed from the raw EEG traces 
according to a method outlined by Zhang et al. (2017). Thirdly, the experimenter visually 
scanned the remaining EEG traces to identify any residual artefact caused by movement or eye-
blinks that were not appropriately removed by the program. The original recording from Fp1 
was used as a comparison to ensure eye-blinks had properly been removed. Missing value 
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markers were used to replace remaining eye-blink or movement related artefact across all 
channels.   
Spectral Power Post-Processing – Stop trials and Go trials 
EEG data were first converted to calibrated microvolt values. Then, power analyses were 
conducted by applying a nominal overlapping Hanning window to a 1-second period during 
each trial. Application of the Hanning window on Stop trials began at 0.25 seconds prior to 
presentation of the Stop (auditory) signal and ended at 0.25 seconds following the termination 
of the Stop signal. On Go trials, the Hanning window was applied at the same position as the 
Stop signal in the immediately adjacent Stop trial. The cosine waveform of the Hanning 
window allowed maximum power to be extracted from the central 0.5 seconds (section of 
interest) and minimum power from the 0.25 seconds at each end of the 1 second period. Using 
the Hanning window resulted in improved quality and doubled frequency resolution of the 
Fourier transform that followed than would have been obtained using a 0.5s square window. 
All data then underwent Fast Fourier Transformation and log transformation to normalize error 
variance, before the averages of Stop and Go trials for each participant and SSD type were 
calculated.   
Statistical Analyses 
Obtaining GCSR 
For each participant, Goal Conflict Specific Rhythmicity (GCSR) values were calculated from 
each block of trials and frequency step extracted by the Fourier transform. Firstly, for each 
participant and SSD type, the average, matching trial, ‘Go’ power was subtracted from the 
average ‘Stop’ power to obtain the power specific to the Stop signal. Secondly, the Stop-Go 
differences averaged over both the long and the short SSD trials were subtracted from the 
average Stop-Go differences of the intermediate SSD trials. This provided a calculation for the 
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individual GCSR values, which were equivalent to the interaction effect of trial type with the 
quadratic component of SSD in a conventional ANOVA of simple power values.  
These GCSR values were then subjected to 3 point smoothing to reduce error variance 
that is produced as a result of applying the Fourier Transform in the previous steps. The Fourier 
Transform, with a 1s window, has to allocate the power of the signal to a specific integer 
frequency (i.e. 4 Hz or 5 Hz) even if the power falls in between specific frequencies (e.g. 4.5 
Hz). Slight differences in the frequency can then mean that the Fourier Transform at sometimes 
allocates the power to the lower frequency (i.e. 4 Hz), and at other times to the higher frequency 
(i.e. 5 Hz), therefore generating large error variance across trials for the power value at each 
frequency. Applying a 3-point smoothing transformation averages across frequencies to reduce 
this error variance (e.g. reducing differences between 4 and 5 Hz) and also provides a visually 
clearer signal, reducing power spikes at particular frequency values.  
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
We performed four ANOVA analyses using the IBM SPSS Statistics Package (See Chapter 3) 
on GCSR values that had undergone 3 point smoothing. The specific purposes and details of 
each ANOVA are outlined below.  
Analysis 1: Comparison of High, Medium and Low STAI-T SJS Scorers 
Nominally healthy participants recruited from SJS were separated into distinct nearly equal 
sized groups of high, medium and low STAI-T scorers and subjected to ANOVA to investigate 
group differences in GCSR. The number of participants differed slightly in each of the three 
groups as participants with the same STAI-T score were kept in the same groups. The high 
STAI-T scoring group contained 21 SJS participants (mean score = 46.7), the medium group 
contained 18 SJS participants (mean score = 36.7), and the low group contained 22 SJS 
participants (mean score = 29.3).  
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Analysis 2: Comparison of Clinically High STAI-T SJS Scorers and Matched SJS Controls 
Participants recruited from SJS were separated into a group of high STAI-T scorers and a 
demographically matched group of low STAI-T scorers and subjected to ANOVA to 
investigate group differences in GCSR. Cut-off STAI-T scores used in the present study to 
separate SJS participants into these distinct groups were taken from a review of the existing 
literature. In the research literature, Fisher and Durham (1999) found that the mean STAI-trait 
values obtained from clinical GAD groups within six treatment outcome studies ranged from 
47 to 61. Based on the review, Fisher and Durham (1999) established a clinically significant 
STAI-T cut-off point at 46. This meant individuals who produced STAI-T scores below 46 
were classified within the functional range and those that scored above 46 or above were 
classified in the functionally impaired range. In the present study, we accordingly selected our 
clinical-level STAI-T cut-off point at 45. The mean STAI-T score obtained by SJS participants 
who fell above this cut-off was 51.6. This mean score fell within the range of means obtained 
from other clinically anxious treatment groups therefore we concluded that our ‘Above Cut-
off’ (i.e. nominally ‘anxious’) SJS group had similar STAI-Trait characteristics to previous 
diagnosed clinically anxious groups. However, it should be noted that this group had been 
recruited through SJS and had not self-identified as clinically anxious. They had therefore not 
received the MINI and could not be assigned a DSM diagnosis. The control comparison group 
of ‘Below Cut-off’ (i.e. nominally ‘non-anxious’) SJS participants was constructed by selecting 
SJS participants with STAI-scores below the clinical cut-off in such a way as to closely as 
possible match the age, gender and ethnicity of the ‘Above Cut-off’ STAI-T scorers. There 
were 12 SJS participants included in each of the ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ STAI-
T groups.  
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Analyses 3 and 4: Comparison of Patients, Clinically High STAI-T SJS Scorers and Matched SJS 
Controls 
Participants recruited from SJS and separated into ‘Above Cut-off’ and matched ‘Below Cut-
off’ STAI-T groups (see analysis 2), along with patient participants, were subjected to separate 
pair-wise ANOVAs to investigate differences in GCSR between the groups. Patient 
participants were recruited on the basis that they reported suffering from ongoing symptoms of 
anxiety, fear, or panic. There were 12 SJS participants each of the ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below 




Chapter 3: Results 
As described in Chapter 1, the primary aim of the current study was to investigate GCSR 
strength within a sample of anxiety disorder patients compared to healthy controls. Due to the 
low number of patients recruited during the study period, a preliminary analysis was conducted 
on the much larger number of participants recruited from Student Job Search (n=86). We 
expected that within the large sample of SJS participants, there would be individuals who were 
experiencing symptoms of anxiety, fear and panic, which could be quantitatively similar to 
patient samples but not explicitly reported as disorder since this was not mentioned during 
recruitment. On this basis, we aimed to separate these ‘anxious’ SJS participants from ‘non-
anxious’ SJS participants, post hoc, using their responses on personality questionnaires, 
specifically their STAI-T scores. Our initial analysis simply split the available participants into 
three groups based on STAI-T score (high, medium, and low STAI-T score) with no attempt 
to match on demographics. We next assessed potential differences in GCSR strength between 
‘Above Cut-off’ SJS participants (defined as having STAI-T scores in the clinical range) and 
matched ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants (defined as having STAI-T scores below the clinical 
range). Importantly, this procedure ensured that recruitment of the two groups was the same. 
Finally, we compared the strength of GCSR produced by ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ 
SJS participants to the GCSR produced by a small sample of participants recruited as patients 
and diagnosed with a range of DSM-5 anxiety disorders. Here, our interest was to test for 
generalisation of our ‘Above Cut-off’ (i.e. nominally ‘clinically anxious’) results across 




Analyses of large SJS Sample 
Overall Demographic Data and Goal Conflict Specific Rhythmicity - see also subgroup demographics 
and GCSR data below. 
There were 26 male and 60 female participants recruited from SJS in this study. Participants 
were aged between 18 to 37 years old (mean age = 22). STAI-T scores obtained by participants 
ranged from 23 to 58 (mean STAI-T score = 38.4). Neuroticism scores ranged from 0 to 22 
(mean Neuroticism score = 6.4).  
Goal Conflict Specific Rhythmicity (GCSR) values were extracted, as previously 
(McIntosh, 2015; Shadli et al., 2015) from the right frontal site (F8), and calculated as the 
difference in stop signal power (i.e. stop minus matching go) for intermediate SSDs relative to 
the stop-go power difference averaged over short and long SSDs (see also Chapter 2). As shown 
in Figure 3.1, significant positive GCSR was obtained on average across all blocks of the SST 
(Intercept, F(1, 63) = 3.949, p = 0.05). This pattern of positive GCSR obtained across blocks 
and frequencies was consistent with greater power being detected during intermediate SSD 
trials compared to short and long SSD trials. On average across all blocks, GCSR decreased 
with increasing frequency (Frequency[Linear], F(1, 63) = 7.756, p = 0.007), however  the form 
of this variation in GCSR across frequencies differed between blocks (Blocks x 
Frequency[Quadratic], F(1, 63) = 7.481, p = 0.008). In block 1, GCSR was weakly positive 
from 5 to 10 Hz and became weakly negative at 10 to 11 Hz. In block 2, GCSR was positive 
across frequencies ranging from 5 to 10 Hz, with a peak at 8 Hz. GCSR became weakly 
negative at 10 to 11 Hz. In block 3, positive GCSR values were observed across 5 to 8 Hz and 




Figure 3.1. Goal Conflict Specific Rhythmicity (GCSR, log micro V²) calculated from F8 EEG of SJS 
participants as a function of increasing frequency (Hz) in Blocks 1, 2, and 3 of the SST. GCSR was 
generally positive across frequencies and blocks. GCSR became weakly negative at 10 to 11 Hz in 
blocks 1 and 2, but was positive across other frequencies. GCSR peaked at 5 Hz in block 1, at 8 Hz in 
block 2, and at 6 Hz in block 3.  
Analysis One: Comparison of GCSR Obtained by High, Medium and Low STAI-T Scorers 
An ANOVA was performed on the large sample of SJS EEG data to explore differences in 
GCSR between SJS participants separated into three approximately equal groups. The groups 
were separated based on STAI score: (1) participants who obtained a ‘low’ STAI-T score 
(STAI-T < 34); (2) participants who obtained a ‘medium’ STAI-T score (STAI-T = 34-39); 
and (3) participants who obtained a ‘high’ STAI-T score (STAI-T > 39). The ANOVA was 
performed separately for block 1, 2, and 3, but contained the same within-subjects factor 
(frequency, Hz), between-subjects factor (group, 3 levels of STAI-T scores: high, medium and 
low) and measure variable (GCSR, log µV²) for all blocks. 
Analysis One: Demographic Data and GCSR Results 
As shown in Table 3.1, the ratio of male to female participants was smallest in the ‘High’ STAI-


































groups was similar around 21 to 23 years old. The mean Neuroticism, PID-5 Anxiety and PID-
5 Depressivity scores were all highest in the ‘High’ STAI-T group and lowest in the ‘Low’ 
STAI-T group.  The difference in these scores was larger between the ‘High’ and ‘Medium’ 
STAI-T groups compared to the ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ STAI-T groups.  
Table 3.1. Demographic information for groups of SJS participants separated based on STAI-T score. 
M:F = number of male/female participants, percentage male given in brackets; Age = age range of 
participants in years, mean age given in brackets; Neur = mean Neuroticism; STAI-T = mean 
Spielberger Trait Anxiety; PID-5 Anxiety = DSM-5 Personality Inventory mean anxiety score; and PID-
5 Depressivity = DSM-5 Personality Inventory mean depressivity score. 
 M:F (%M) Age in years 
(average) 




High 6:23 (21%) 18-30 (20.8)  48.2 10.9 27.3   27.1 
Medium 8:18 (31%) 18-37 (23.3) 37.1 5.3 18.0 20.5 
Low 12:19 (39%) 18-32 (21.9) 30.0 3.0 14.4 16.5 
 
As seen in Figure 3.2, GCSR strength in block 1 appeared to be greatest at lower 
frequencies for both the low and high STAI-T groups and not for the medium STAI-T group, 
however there was no reliable difference between groups in GCSR variation across frequencies 
(Group x Frequency[all trends], all F(2, 75) < 1.536, all p > 0.222). There was also no 
significant difference in strength of GCSR averaged across frequency between groups in block 
1 (Group, F(2, 75) = 1.091, p = 0.341). In block 2 (Figure 3.2), GCSR appeared to be more 
strongly positive between 7-8 Hz in the high STAI-T group compared to both the medium and 
low STAI-T groups. However the variation across frequencies was not significantly different 
between groups (Group x Frequency[all trends], all F(2, 70) < 2.374, all p > 0.101) and the 
overall difference between groups was not significant (Group, F(2, 70) = 0.196, p = 0.823).  In 
block 3 (Figure 3.2), GCSR appeared to be slightly more positive between 5 to 8 Hz on average 
across high and medium STAI-T groups compared to the low STAI-T group, but this apparent 
difference did not approach statistical significance (Group, F(2, 67) = 0.326, p = 0.723).   
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The bottom graph displayed in Figure 3.2 presents GCSR averaged across all blocks of 
the SST for the three STAI-T groups. On average across blocks, GCSR displayed a tendency 
to decrease with increasing frequency for high, medium, and low STAI-T groups (Frequency 
[linear], F(1, 63) = 7.756, p = 0.007). GCSR appeared to be most strongly positive in the high 
STAI-T group compared to the medium and low STAI-T groups, although this did not approach 
significance (Group x Frequency[all trends], all F(2, 63) < 0.723, all p > 0.489).  
Overall, despite superficial appearance, this first analysis provided no reliable 
indication that GCSR strength differed between SJS participants who obtained a high STAI-T 
score compared to a medium or low STAI-T score. While SJS participants with high STAI-T 
scores may have shown stronger positive GCSR, particularly in block 2, compared to medium 
and low STAI-T scorers, this was not a reliable difference. Importantly, this analysis was 
conducted on a larger sample of SJS participants than previously, however it was limited by its 
lack of control for demographic differences between the groups separated according to STAI-
T score. Confounding factors such as gender (which was clearly unbalanced), age, ethnicity, 
and other demographic variables may have introduced a sampling bias into this analysis and 
masked potential differences between groups. We, therefore, conducted a second analysis to 
investigate potential differences in GCSR between high and low STAI-T scorers controlling 











































































































Figure 3.2. GCSR (log μV²) 
obtained from F8 as a function of 
increasing frequency (Hz) for 
high, medium, and low STAI-T 
scorers. Block 1, 2 and 3 are 
presented in relative order starting 
at the top of the figure. The 
average of GCSR produced 
across all blocks for the three 
groups is presented at the bottom 
of the figure. Overall, there was a 
tendency for GCSR to be stronger 
in the high STAI-T group 
compared to the medium and low 
STAI-T groups, particularly in 
block 2, however this tendency 




Analyses Two, Three and Four: Demographic and Behavioural Data for SJS and Patient Participants 
As shown in Table 3.2, the ratio of male to female participants and mean age of participants 
was identical in both ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participant groups. Mean 
Neuroticism, PID-5 Anxiety and PID-5 depressivity scores were all higher in the ‘Above Cut-
off’ group compared to the ‘Below Cut-off’ group (Group, all F(1, 34) > 52.4, all p < 0.001). 
The ratio of male to female participants was higher in the sample of Patients compared to the 
‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS groups. The mean age of Patients (30 years) was also 
higher than the mean age of participants in both the ‘Above’ and ‘Below’ Cut-off groups (20 
years). The mean Neuroticism, STAI-T, PID-5 Anxiety, and PID-5 Depressivity scores were 
all significantly higher in the Patient sample compared to the ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS sample 
(Group, all F(1, 37) > 112.3, all p < 0.001). There were no significant differences in the mean 
STAI-T and PID-5 Depressivity scores obtained by the ‘Above Cut-off’ group compared to the 
Patient group (Group, both F(1, 37) < 2.2, both p > 0.15). However, the mean Neuroticism 
(Group, F(1, 37) = 4.970, p =0.032) and PID-5 Anxiety  (Group, F(1, 37) = 5.867, p = 0.02) 
scores were significantly higher in the Patient sample than the ‘Above Cut-off’ group.  
Table 3.2. Demographic information for ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS, ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS and Patient 
participants. M:F = number of male/female participants, percentage male given in brackets; Age = age 
range of participants in years, average given in brackets; STAI-T = mean Spielberger Trait Anxiety; 
Neur = mean Neuroticism; PID-5 Anxiety = DSM-5 Personality Inventory mean anxiety score; and PID-
5 Depressivity = DSM-5 Personality Inventory mean depressivity score. Standard deviation for STAI-T, 
Neur, PID-5 Anxiety, and PID-5 Depressivity given in brackets.  
 M:F Age, years 
(average) 




Below  4:14 (22%) 18-27 (20) 33.9 (4.2) 3.2 (3.1) 15.4 (3.8) 17.9 (6.1) 
Above  4:14 (22%) 18-28 (20) 51.5 (4.1) 12.6 (4.3) 24.3 (6.6) 29.8 (9.1) 




Table 3.3. Behavioural information for the three groups of participants for all blocks of the SST. GoRT 
= median reaction time in Go trials (ms); SSRT = Stop signal reaction time (ms) estimated using the 
horse race model; Pinhibit = probability of inhibiting response on Stop trials, for trials with short, medium 
and long SSDs respectively. 






 Below 420.4 224.9 73.6% 45.6% 9.1% 
Above 407.5 223.9 70.7% 44.3% 9.1% 
Patients 438.1 239.7 75.2% 51.8% 9.1% 
 Below 411 212.3 80.7% 44.9% 15.2% 
Above 415.1 212.4 70.4% 43.7% 15.7% 
Patients 451.5 230.5 80.4% 43.4% 10.3% 
 Below 406.3 213.7 78.1% 42.2% 8.9% 
Above 399.5 197.3 70.3% 45.2% 12.6% 
Patients 438.0 215.5 80.6% 48.8% 12.3% 
	
As shown in Table 3.3, the median recorded reaction time obtained from Go trials (Go RT) across 
all three blocks tended to be slower for Patient participants than ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-
off’ SJS participants, although no reliable differences were found (Group, all F(1, 37) < 3.7, all p 
> 0.063). Similarly, the Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) obtained by Patients also appeared 
slower compared to ‘Above’ and ‘Below’ Cut-off SJS participants across all three blocks of the 
SST, however this difference was not significant (Group, all F(1, 37) < 2.982, all p > 0.093). SSD 
trials were divided into short, medium and long trials and the percentage correct inhibition of 


















values between Patient, ‘Above Cut-off’, and ‘Below Cut-off’ participants across blocks (Group, 
all F(1, 37) < 3.3, all p > 0.075).	
Analysis Two: Comparison of GCSR Obtained by ‘Above Cut-off’ STAI-T Scorers and ‘Below Cut-
off’ Matched Controls 
To address the limitation of potential sampling bias in the first analysis, a second analysis was 
conducted between a group of SJS participants with STAI-T scores in the clinically high range 
(‘Above Cut-off’, STAI-T > 45) and a control group with STAI-T scores not in the clinically 
high range (‘Below Cut-off’, STAI-T < 46) but matched to the above cut-off group on gender 
and age. Note that the ‘Below Cut-off’ group in this analysis was different from the ‘low’ group 
in the first analysis as it contained participants that were included in both the ‘low’ and 
‘medium’ groups of the first analysis. As before, ANOVAs were performed separately for 
blocks 1, 2, and 3 to investigate differences in GCSR across frequencies. Each ANOVA had 
one within-subjects factor (frequency, Hz), one between-subjects factor (group, 2 different 
levels of STAI-T scores; Above Cut-off and Below Cut-off) and a single measure variable 
(GCSR, log µV²).   
As shown in Figure 3.3, block 1 GCSR appeared to decrease somewhat with increasing 
frequency for both ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS groups, although this tendency 
was not significant (Frequency [linear], F(1, 30) = 1.821, p = 0.187). GCSR produced by SJS 
participants in the ‘Below Cut-off’ group, contrary to prediction, was positive across all 
frequencies and appeared stronger than the GCSR produced by SJS participants in the ‘Above 
Cut-off’ group in block 1. However, this qualitative observation was not reliable as there was 
no significant difference in GCSR strength averaged across frequencies between the two 
groups (Group, F(1, 30) = 2.215, p = 0.147).   
In block 2 (Figure 3.3), significant positive GCSR was present across both groups, with 
the greatest effects observed at intermediate frequencies (Frequency [quadratic], F(1, 32) = 
5.486, p = 0.026; Frequency [order 4], F(1, 32) = 10.671, p = 0.003). In the ‘Above Cut-off’ 
50	
	
group, GCSR was weakly positive at lower frequencies, increasing to a peak at 7 Hz, before 
decreasing again and becoming negative at 9 to 11 Hz. In the ‘Below Cut-off’ group, GCSR 
was positive across all frequencies, with a peak at 8 Hz. The GCSR peak at 7 Hz produced by 
the ‘Above Cut-off’ group was stronger than the GCSR peak at 8 Hz produced by the ‘Below 
Cut-off’ group. The variation in curve shape was reliable (Group x Frequency [cubic], F(1, 32) 
= 4.262, p = 0.047; Group x Frequency [order 5], F(1, 32) = 7.563, p = 0.010). Although peak 
GCSR was stronger in the ‘Above Cut-off’ group compared to the ‘Below Cut-off’ group, there 
was no reliable difference in overall GCSR strength averaged across frequencies between 
groups (Group, F(1, 32) =0.256, p = 0.616) in block 2.  
In block 3 (Figure 3.3), GCSR produced by the ‘Above Cut-off’ group was positive 
across all frequencies, whereas GCSR produced by the ‘Below Cut-off’ was weakly positive 
at 4 to 5 Hz, becoming negative between 6 to 11 Hz. GCSR in the ‘Above Cut-off’ group 
appeared stronger than the GCSR in the matched ‘Below Cut-off’ group across frequencies, 
but this difference did not reach significance (Group, F(1, 30) =1.662, p = 0.207; Group x 
Frequency [Linear], F(1, 30) = 2.078, p = 0.160; Group x Frequency [Quadratic], F(1, 30) = 
1.053, p = 0.313).  
The graph displayed at the bottom of Figure 3.3 presents the average GCSR across all 
blocks of the SST for the ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS groups. On average across 
blocks, GCSR decreased with increasing frequency across both groups (Frequency [linear], 
F(1, 28) = 11.896, p = 0.002). In the ‘Above Cut-off’ group, GCSR was positive between 5 to 
9 Hz, peaking at 7 Hz, before becoming negative at 10 to 11 Hz. In the ‘Below Cut-off’ group, 
GCSR was positive between 5 to 7 Hz, and became weakly negative between 8 to 11 Hz. There 
was a tendency for GCSR to be more strongly positive in the ‘Above Cut-off’ group compared 
to the ‘Below Cut-off’ group across frequencies and blocks of the SST, although this tendency 






































































































Figure 3.3. Goal Conflict 
Specific Rhythmicity (GCSR; 
log μV²) obtained from F8 as a 
function of increasing 
frequency (Hz) for the above 
cut-off STAI-T group and the 
matched below cut-off STAI-T 
group. Block 1, 2 and 3 are 
presented in relative order 
starting at the top of the figure. 
The average of GCSR 
produced across all blocks for 
the two groups is presented at 
the bottom of the figure. In 
block 1, GCSR appeared 
stronger in the Below Cut-off 
group compared to the Above 
Cut-off group. In blocks 2 and 3, 
the reverse pattern was 
observed, with GCSR tending 
to be stronger in the Above Cut-
off group compared to the 
Below Cut-off group.  
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After controlling for specific demographic variables (i.e. age, gender and ethnicity), 
small differences in GCSR were observed between SJS participants with STAI-T scores in the 
‘clinically high’ range (i.e. ‘Above Cut-off’) and SJS participants with STAI-T scores below 
the ‘clinically high range’ (i.e. ‘Below Cut-off’). Given the small sample size, and low level of 
statistical significance, these apparent group differences must be interpreted cautiously. 
Nonetheless, the results of the second analysis indicated that GCSR was slightly higher in the 
‘Below Cut-off’ group compared to the ‘Above Cut-off’ group in block 1. In blocks 2 and 3, 
the reverse pattern was found with slightly higher GCSR observed in the ‘Above Cut-off’ group 
compared to the ‘Below Cut-off’ group. These apparent group differences appeared stronger 
than the subtle group differences observed in the first analysis where demographic variables 
were not controlled for. This suggests that sampling biases may have masked the presence of 
stronger group differences in the larger sample of SJS participants analysed in the first analysis. 
Comparison of SJS and Patient Participants 
In the analysis conducted on a sample of SJS participants, subtle group differences were found 
in the strength of GCSR obtained from ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS participants compared to matched 
‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants. Particularly in blocks 2 and 3, GCSR appeared to be more 
strongly positive in the ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS group compared to the ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS group, 
although these qualitative differences were not generally reliable and so must be interpreted 
cautiously. Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with the presence of small differences in 
GCSR between nominally ‘anxious’ and ‘non-anxious’ SJS participants when recruitment 
methods are matched. We conducted further analyses to test the generalisation of these small 
SJS group differences to a sample of patient participants diagnosed with a variety of DSM-5 
anxiety disorders, who were recruited via a different method. We first investigated the presence 
of differences in GCSR strength between Patients and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants 
predicting similar effects to those between ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’. We then 
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investigated the presence of GCSR differences between Patients and the ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS 
participants predicting that there would be no difference.  
Analysis Three: Comparison of GCSR Obtained by Clinical Patients and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS 
Participants 
An ANOVA was performed on the sample of ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants (used in 
analysis two) and a sample of Patient participants to explore differences in GCSR between 
these nominally ‘healthy’ SJS control participants and patient participants diagnosed with 
DSM-5 anxiety disorders. The ANOVA was performed separately for block 1, 2, and 3, but 
contained the same within-subjects factor (frequency, Hz), between-subjects factor (group, 2 
levels: ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS and patients) and measure variable (GCSR, log µV²) for all blocks. 
As shown in Figure 3.4 block 1, positive GCSR was obtained on average across both 
the Patient group and the ‘Below Cut-off’ group (Intercept, F(1, 33) = 7.395, p = 0.010). GCSR 
appeared to be more strongly positive in the ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS group compared to the Patient 
group, particularly between 8 to 10 Hz. However no reliable difference in GCSR variation 
across frequencies or strength of GCSR on average across frequencies was found between 
groups (Group x Frequency[all trends], all F(1, 33) < 0.718, all p > 0.403; Group, F(1, 33) = 
0.675, p = 0.417).  
 In block 2 (Figure 3.4), positive GCSR tended to be observed at all frequencies on 
average across both groups; however this tendency approached, but did not reach significance 
(Intercept, F(1, 34) = 3.877, p = 0.057). GCSR tended to be more strongly positive in the Patient 
group than in the ‘Below Cut-off’ group between frequencies 5 to 7 Hz. Between 8 to 9 Hz, 
GCSR was slightly more positive in the ‘Below Cut-off’ group compared to the Patient group. 
Although GCSR showed qualitative differences between the Patient and ‘Below Cut-off’ 
































































































Figure 3.4. GCSR (log μV²) 
obtained from F8 as a function of 
increasing frequency (Hz) for 
Patient and Below Cut-off SJS 
participants. Block 1, 2 and 3 are 
presented in relative order starting 
at the top of the figure. The 
average of GCSR produced 
across all blocks for the three 
groups is presented at the bottom 
of the figure. In block 1, GCSR 
obtained by the Below Cut-off 
group tended to be greater than 
GCSR obtained by the Patient 
group. Alternatively, in blocks 2 
and 3, GCSR tended to be lower 
in the Below Cut-off group 
compared to the Patient group. 
This effect was particularly strong 
in block 3, with GCSR being 
significantly greater in the Patient 





frequencies between groups (Group, F(1, 34) = 0.076, p = 0.784; Group x Frequency[all 
trends], all F(1, 34) < 3.1, all p > 0.09).  
In block 3 (Figure 3.4), Patient participants produced stronger positive GCSR compared 
to ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants, who produced negative GCSR. Strong positive GCSR was 
observed across all frequencies in the Patient group, whereas in the ‘Below Cut-off’ group, 
negative GCSR was observed between 7 to 11 Hz. This difference in GCSR strength on average 
across frequencies between ‘Below Cut-off’ and Patient groups was reliable (Group, F(1, 33) 
= 4.922, p = 0.034).   
The bottom graph of Figure 3.4 shows the average GCSR across all blocks of the SST 
for both groups. On average across blocks, frequencies, and groups, significant positive GCSR 
was obtained (Intercept, F(1, 32) = 7.742, p = 0.009). GCSR displayed a tendency to decrease 
with increasing frequency when averaging across blocks, and this tendency reached 
significance (Frequency [linear], F(1, 32) = 8.772, p = 0.006). GCSR was positive across all 
frequencies in the Patient group, but was weakly negative in the ‘Below Cut-off’ group between 
8 to 11 Hz. Across all frequencies, GCSR appeared more strongly positive in the Patient group 
than in the ‘Below Cut-off’ group, although this difference was not reliable Group x 
Frequency[all trends], all F(1, 32) < 1.3, all p > 0.25). 
Analysis Four: Comparison of GCSR Obtained by Clinical Patients and ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS 
Participants 
An ANOVA was performed on the sample of ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS participants (used in 
analysis two) and a sample of patient participants to explore differences in GCSR between 
these nominally ‘anxious’ SJS control participants and patient participants diagnosed with 
DSM-5 anxiety disorders. The ANOVA was performed separately for block 1, 2, and 3, but 
contained the same within-subjects factor (frequency, Hz), between-subjects factor (group, 2 
levels: ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS and Patients) and measure variable (GCSR, log µV²) for all blocks. 
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As shown in Figure 3.5 block 1, positive GCSR was obtained across frequencies for 
Patient participants, whereas ‘Above Cut-off’ participants tended to show weak positive GCSR 
between 5 to 7 Hz, but negative GCSR between 8 to 11 Hz. There was no significant difference 
in GCSR variation across frequencies between ‘Above Cut-off’ and Patient groups (Group x 
Frequency[all trends], all F(1, 33) < 2.0, all p > 0.15). There was also no reliable difference in 
strength of GCSR on average across frequency between groups (Group, F(1, 33) = 0.747, p = 
0.394).  
 In block 2 (Figure 3.5), positive GCSR was observed on average across both Patient 
and ‘Above Cut-off’ participants, although this did not reach significance (Intercept, F(1, 34) 
= 3.171, p = 0.084). There was a difference in GCSR variation across frequency between 
Patients and the ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS group that just achieved significance in the absence of 
Bonferroni correction (Group x Frequency[order4], F(1, 34) = 4.168, p = 0.049). On average 
across Patient participants, GCSR was strongest at lower frequencies and steadily decreased 
with increasing frequency, becoming weakly positive at higher frequencies. On average across 
SJS participants in the ‘Above Cut-off’ group, GCSR was weakly negative at 5 Hz, increased 
to a strong positive peak at 7 Hz, before decreasing again and becoming negative at 9 Hz. 
Overall, there was no significant difference in GCSR strength between the two groups (Group, 
F(1, 34) = 1.008, p = 0.323).   
In block 3 (Figure 3.5), significant positive GCSR was obtained across frequencies on 
average for ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS and Patient participants (Intercept, F(1, 33) = 5.222, p = 
0.029). GCSR obtained by Patient participants appeared to be more strongly positive on 
average across frequencies than GCSR obtained by ‘Above Cut-off’ participants, although this 



































































































Figure 3.5. GCSR (log μV²) 
obtained from F8 as a function of 
increasing frequency (Hz) for 
Patient and Above Cut-off SJS 
participants. Block 1, 2 and 3 are 
presented in relative order starting 
at the top of the figure. The 
average of GCSR produced across 
all blocks for the three groups is 
presented at the bottom of the 
figure. Across all blocks, patient 
participants obtained similar, if not 
stronger, GCSR to Above Cut-off 
SJS participants. No reliable 
differences in average GCSR 
strength across frequencies were 
found between patient and Above 
Cut-off SJS participants in blocks 




The bottom graph of Figure 3.5 shows the average GCSR across all blocks of the SST 
for the ‘Above Cut-off’ and Patient groups. On average across blocks, frequencies, and groups, 
significant positive GCSR was obtained (Intercept, F(1, 32) = 10.096, p = 0.003). GCSR 
decreased with increasing frequency when averaging across blocks (Frequency [linear], F(1, 
32) = 8.523, p = 0.006). There was no reliable difference in GCSR strength or variation across 
frequencies between ‘Above Cut-off’ and Patient participants when averaging across blocks 
(Group, F(1, 32) = 2.108, p = 0.156; Frequency x Group[all trends], F(1, 32) < 2.503, p > 
0.123). 
Summary of analyses 3-4 
Overall, the third and fourth analyses showed that the subtle group differences in GCSR 
strength detected in analysis two were qualitatively generalised to a small patient sample. In 
block 1, ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants produced higher GCSR values than Patient 
participants. In blocks 2 and 3, there was a tendency for GCSR to be stronger in the Patient 
group compared to the ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS group. These differences were most evident in 
block 3, where a significant difference in GCSR strength between Patients and ‘Below Cut-
off’ SJS participants was found. When averaging across patients and ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS 
participants, strong positive GCSR was detected. Although there was a reliable difference in 
variation of GCSR across frequencies between Patients and ‘Above Cut-off’ groups in block 
2, there were no reliable differences in GCSR strength between these two groups across blocks. 
In sum, small differences in GCSR strength detected in analysis two were even stronger 
when comparing patient participants against ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants. There was no 
reliable difference in overall GCSR strength between patients and ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS 
participants. This allows the results of analysis two to generalise to patient samples despite the 
difference in recruitment methods. 
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Overall Summary of Results 
This chapter first reported the results from a preliminary analysis on a large SJS sample 
investigating GCSR differences between nominally ‘anxious’ (i.e. ‘Above Cut-off’) and ‘non-
anxious’ (i.e. ‘Below Cut-off’) participants. When controlling for demographic factors, subtle 
GCSR differences were found between ‘Above’ and ‘Below’ Cut-off SJS participants. 
Specifically, in block 1 GCSR appeared higher in the ‘Below Cut-off’ group, whereas in blocks 
2 and 3 GCSR appeared higher in the ‘Above Cut-off’ group. Caution must be taken when 
interpreting these results as these qualitative differences in GCSR were not reliable. The results 
of the primary analysis investigating GCSR differences between a small sample of anxiety 
disorder patients and healthy ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS controls were then reported. In this analysis, 
subtle GCSR differences observed between ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS 
participants generalised to, and became even more pronounced, within a DSM-5 anxiety 
disorder patient sample. Again, GCSR appeared stronger in the ‘Below Cut-off’ group 
compared to the Patient sample in block 1, although this apparent difference was unreliable. 
Alternatively, Patients produced stronger GCSR in blocks 2 and 3 than ‘Below Cut-off’ 
participants. This difference was most clearly seen in block 3 where GCSR differences between 
groups were reliable. Overall, the results reported in this chapter provide tentative support for 
higher GCSR in patients diagnosed with DSM-5 Anxiety Disorders compared to ‘Below Cut-




Chapter 4: Discussion 
Aims and Results of the Study 
This study aimed to take important first steps in validating an anxiolytic-sensitive biomarker - 
GCSR - within a clinical ‘anxiety’ patient sample.  In chapter one, it was predicted that DSM-
5 ‘anxiety disorder’ patients on average would produce higher GCSR than control participants. 
The results of the present study were broadly consistent with this hypothesis. Patient 
participants, who displayed clinically high STAI-T scores, produced stronger positive GCSR 
compared to SJS control participants with non-clinical STAI-T scores. These preliminary 
findings are important first steps in the validation and translation of GCSR to clinical settings. 
Nonetheless, there are some limitations of this study that reduce the strength of the conclusions 
that can be drawn. These include the recruitment of only a small number of patient participants 
during the study period, and the lack of an appropriately matched control sample. Further 
research addressing these limitations will allow more confident conclusions. In the long-term, 
clinical validation and translation of this anxiolytic-sensitive biomarker will contribute to the 
transformation of mental disorder diagnostic systems to more rational and biological systems, 
enhancing treatment selection and effectiveness.  
 Due to the low number of patients recruited during the time period of this study, 
preliminary analyses were first conducted on a large sample of SJS participants who did not 
explicitly report symptoms of anxiety, fear, or panic. We expected that, within the sample of 
SJS participants, there would be individuals who were experiencing similar symptoms of 
anxiety, fear, and panic, to the patients with DSM-5 anxiety diagnoses. Although the presence 
of anxiety symptoms within the sample of SJS participants was not specifically assessed via 
clinical interview, we aimed to separate ‘anxious’ participants from ‘non-anxious’ participants 
using STAI-T scores as a proxy measure for anxiety. The STAI is designed to have high scores 
in clinical populations and to some extent represents an aggregate measure of reported clinical 
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anxiety symptomatology. Potential differences in GCSR strength between predicted ‘anxious’ 
and ‘non-anxious’ SJS participants were explored.  
The first preliminary analysis specifically investigated differences in the strength of 
GSCR between SJS participants who obtained ‘High’, ‘Medium’, and ‘Low’ STAI-T scores. 
Results showed a tendency for ‘High’ STAI-T scorers to produce stronger positive GCSR than 
‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ STAI-T scorers, although these differences were variable, small and 
unreliable. Importantly, there were multiple confounding factors not controlled for between 
groups in this analysis that may have accounted for the large variation and low statistical 
significance observed. These three groups not only differed on the basis of their STAI-T scores, 
but also on other demographic factors such as gender. It is possible that demographic 
differences between groups distorted results, masking true differences in GCSR between 
groups.  
A second preliminary analysis on SJS participants was therefore conducted to 
investigate GCSR differences between high and low STAI-T scorers, while controlling for 
demographic variables (i.e. gender, age). In this analysis, a clinical cut-off STAI-T score was 
selected based on relevant literature and SJS participants with a score above this cut-off were 
classified as ‘Above Cut-off’. In contrast, participants who scored below this cut-off were 
classified as ‘Below Cut-off’ and then selected as pair-wise matches for ‘Above Cut-off’ 
participants on the basis of demographic factors. After controlling for demographic factors, 
somewhat stronger group differences between ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS 
participants were found than between the groups of the first analysis. This was consistent with 
potential sampling biases masking the observation of true group differences in the first analysis.  
Contrary to predictions, ‘Below Cut-off’ participants tended to produce stronger GCSR than 
‘Above Cut-off’ participants in block 1, however this effect was not significant. In contrast, 
GCSR tended to be more strongly positive in the ‘Above Cut-off’ participants compared to the 
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‘Below Cut-off’ participants in blocks 2 and 3, although again this was not reliable. This latter 
finding was in the direction consistent with predictions. Importantly, caution must be taken 
when interpreting these results due to the small sample size and low level of statistical 
significance. Nonetheless, GCSR appeared stronger in individuals with high STAI-T scores 
compared to matched low STAI-T scorers who were selected via the same recruitment method, 
particularly in blocks 2 and 3 of the SST.  
Further analyses were then conducted to investigate whether observed GCSR 
differences between ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants in analysis two 
generalised across recruitment methods and could be observed in a small sample of patients 
diagnosed with DSM-5 ‘anxiety disorders’. Importantly, this investigation addressed the 
primary aim of this study – to explore whether GCSR is stronger in individuals diagnosed with 
DSM-5 anxiety disorders compared to non-anxious control participants. Overall, the results 
showed that differences in GCSR between ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS-recruited 
participants generalised to, and became more pronounced in, the sample of ‘anxiety disorder’ 
advertisement-recruited patients. STAI-T scores were also highest in the patient sample, 
compared to both ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants; suggesting that high 
STAI-T in analyses one and two was a reasonable proxy for a conventional anxiety diagnosis. 
In block 1, again contrary to prediction, ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants tended to produce 
higher GCSR values than patient participants.  In blocks 2 and 3, stronger positive GCSR was 
obtained in patients compared to ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants. This effect was most 
evident in block 3, where significant differences in GCSR were observed between ‘Below Cut-
off’ SJS participants and patients. Importantly, while the GCSR of patients differed from 
‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants across blocks, patients and ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS participants 
generally produced similar patterns of GCSR across blocks.  
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In sum, patients (who had the highest STAI-T scores) and who explicitly reported 
symptoms of anxiety, tended to produce stronger positive GCSR in blocks 2 and 3 of the SST 
compared to SJS participants with low STAI-T scores, who did not explicitly report symptoms 
of anxiety. Patients produced similar, if not higher, GCSR values than ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS 
participants (with lower average STAI-T scores). Critically, the observed GCSR differences 
between matched ‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants in analyses one and 
two were even stronger in the patient sample. This suggests that the GCSR differences between 
clinically anxious patients and control ‘healthy’ SJS participants were not due to a lack of 
appropriate matching, but more likely to higher STAI-T scores in the patient sample. Overall, 
this study yielded two important preliminary conclusions: (1) GCSR tends to be higher in 
individuals diagnosed with DSM-5 anxiety disorders compared to non-anxious SJS controls; 
and (2) GCSR tends to increase in the positive direction as STAI-T increases.  
Progression toward Clinical Validation and Translation of GCSR 
The primary conclusion drawn from this study is that on average, GCSR tends to be higher in 
individuals diagnosed with anxiety disorders compared to control participants. This 
preliminary conclusion is consistent with predictions based on previous findings. Prior research 
has shown that GCSR correlates with personality measures of traits related to clinical anxiety 
(e.g. Neuroticism, STAI-T) and is reliably reduced by the action of therapeutic anxiolytic drugs 
(McNaughton et al., 2013; Neo et al., 2011; Shadli et al., 2015). Thus, GCSR has been 
previously established as an ‘anxiolytic-sensitive’ biomarker. Importantly, conclusions from 
the present study provide tentative support that GCSR is not only an ‘anxiolytic sensitive’ 
biomarker but also a biomarker for ‘clinical anxiety’, with the potential for clinical translation 
and application. 
The findings of the present study also support theoretical predictions made by 
McNaughton and Corr (2004)'s  neuropsychological model of defensive reactions and their 
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disorders. According to McNaughton (2014), high GCSR is predicted to be a biomarker for 
hyper-reactivity of the BIS. Critically, it is the chronic hyper-reactivity of the BIS that is 
proposed to contribute to the dysfunctional regulation of one anxiety-specific process, and over 
time the emergence of at least one clinical anxiety syndrome.  Therefore, McNaughton 
hypothesised that GCSR may be predictive of one type of clinical anxiety syndrome. The 
results of this study indicate that compared to controls, a heterogeneous group of anxiety 
disorder patients on average displayed higher levels of BIS activation in situations of goal 
conflict during blocks 2 and 3 of the SST. In other words, patients produced higher levels of 
BIS output compared to controls in response to the same level of stimulus input. This provides 
further support for BIS hyper-reactivity underlying one clinical anxiety specific process, 
despite our sample also including people reporting clinical anxiety for other reasons.  
Importantly, GCSR representing BIS activation is predicted to be associated with the 
system regulating defensive approach (i.e. the ‘Anxiety’ system) and not defensive avoidance 
(i.e. the ‘Fear’ system). Thus, McNaughton and Corr (2004) predict that true disorders of 
defensive approach and true disorders of defensive avoidance may be distinguished by BIS 
reactivity/GCSR strength. For example, high GCSR would be expected in individuals suffering 
from disorders of defensive approach. This would be consistent with BIS hyper-reactivity 
underlying symptom manifestations. In contrast, high GCSR would not be expected in 
individuals suffering from disorders of defensive avoidance. This is because their underlying 
pathology is not necessarily related to regulation of the BIS, but rather the FFFS. In the present 
study, the small patient sample was composed of individuals diagnosed with a range of DSM-
5 ‘Anxiety Disorders’. This sample included not only individuals suffering from disorders of 
‘defensive approach’ (i.e. anxiety), but also disorders of ‘defensive avoidance’ (i.e. fear), as 
defined by McNaughton and Corr (2004). Although all patients reported experiencing 
symptoms of anxiety, fear, and panic, the specific neural dysfunction underlying symptom 
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manifestations was likely diverse within this sample. Despite this, it still appears that the 
sample included a substantial number of patients who shared one common underlying neural 
dysfunction: BIS hyper-reactivity (i.e. high GCSR). This likely lead to the observation of 
higher GCSR on average cutting across the DSM-5 anxiety disorder diagnostic labels in 
patients compared to controls. However, heterogeneity may have clouded these results – a 
possibility that could be tested once the patient sample is considerably larger. 
The Relationship of GCSR to STAI-T and other Personality Measures 
The second conclusion of the present study is that GCSR tends to increase positively as STAI-
T increases. This finding is consistent with previous research showing a positive correlation 
between GCSR and STAI-T (Neo et al., 2011; Shadli et al., 2015). The State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory is a frequently used measure of clinical anxiety and demonstrates good discriminant 
and convergent validity with other measures of anxiety and psychopathology (Bieling, Antony, 
& Swinson, 1998; Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983). The observed relationship between GCSR 
and STAI-T, both previously and in this study, supports the theoretical prediction that GCSR 
represents one specific process predictive of clinical anxiety.  
Although a positive relationship between STAI-T and GCSR was identified in the 
present study, there was variability in GCSR patterns observed across blocks when participants 
were separated into groups based on STAI-T. Additionally, group differences in GCSR were 
small and unreliable. This is also consistent with previous research concluding that STAI-T 
does not predict GCSR with high accuracy. In fact, the shared variance of STAI-T and 
Neuroticism predicts GCSR better than either STAI-T or Neuroticism alone (McIntosh, 2015; 
Neo et al., 2011). Furthermore, it has been suggested that STAI-T is not a ‘pure’ measure of 
anxiety. In an investigation of the underlying structure of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait 
scale, Bieling et al. (1998) found that STAI-T also assesses components of depression and 
negative affect (Bieling et al., 1998). Thus, while the present results and previous research 
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findings suggest STAI-T assesses components of the trait underlying GCSR, it does not seem 
to be a complete measure. GCSR appears to represent a trait that is only partially captured by 
STAI-T (McIntosh, 2015). 
Critically, it is predicted that GCSR is associated with one specific type of anxiety and 
will only be observed strongly in some anxious patients. This prediction is based on 
McNaughton and Corr (2004)’s theory that the dysfunctional regulation of the BIS gives rise 
to some cases of clinical anxiety, but not all. Current measures of clinical anxiety, such as the 
STAI-T, aim to widely assess aspects of clinical anxiety (including components of fear as well). 
Therefore, STAI-T is likely predictive of a range of DSM-5 anxiety disorders, whereas GCSR 
is expected to only predict a few. GCSR may represent only one part of current measures of 
clinical anxiety, which would further explain the observed partial relationship between GCSR 
and STAI-T. 
In the present study, high GCSR tended to not only be associated with increased STAI-
T scores, but also with increased Neuroticism, PID-5 Anxiety and PID-5 Depressivity scores. 
This finding is not surprising given previous research reporting a positive correlation between 
Neuroticism and GCSR (Neo et al., 2011; Shadli et al., 2015) and Bieling et al. (1998)'s finding 
that STAI-T provides a measure of not only trait anxiety but also aspects of depression and 
negative affect. However, it does raise the question as to whether GCSR is specific to clinical 
anxiety, or instead, specific to a trait that underlies both anxiety and depression or 
psychopathology in general. The high co-morbidity between anxiety and depression makes it 
difficult to assess the specificity of GCSR to clinical anxiety within a patient population. 
Consistent with this, our patient group had not only the highest STAI-T and PID-5 anxiety 
scores but also the highest PID-5 depressivity scores. Nonetheless, robust research indicating 
that GCSR is an anxiolytic sensitive biomarker suggests that GCSR is more likely predictive 
of clinical anxiety than depression. The significant overlap in the symptomology and traits 
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assessed by these current personality questionnaires makes it difficult to obtain a clear 
understanding of the relationship GCSR has with clinical anxiety when using these existing 
personality measures as a proxy for anxiety. Critically, direct assessment of GCSR within a 
‘pure’ clinical anxiety patient sample (i.e. without co-morbid depression) and comparison with 
mixed and/or pure depression samples is the most robust method, and is required, to establish 
GCSR as an anxiety-specific biomarker. 
The ‘Trait-like’ Nature of GCSR 
 In this study, a smooth distribution of GCSR values was obtained across patients and 
SJS participants who produced a range of STAI-T scores. This finding is consistent with GCSR 
representing a personality-like factor that is associated with the regulation of the BIS, rather 
than a discrete pathological process.   This means that it is not necessarily the presence of high 
GCSR that causes clinical anxiety, but high GCSR may reflect dysfunctional regulation of the 
BIS that predisposes some individuals to developing clinical anxiety. Diagnosing individuals 
with clinical anxiety based on the detection of high individual GCSR may be inappropriate and 
lead to high rates of false positives. While there is, as yet, no evidence for the presence of high 
GCSR in the absence of clinical anxiety, there is also no evidence that high GCSR confirms 
symptoms of clinical anxiety. Instead, identifying high GCSR in patients presenting with 
significant levels of clinical anxiety may allow more precise understanding of the underlying 
pathology associated with their anxiety, and will predict subsequent treatment response.  
Exploration of Unexpected Results 
While the present results yielded predicted differences in GCSR between clinically anxious 
patients and ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS controls in blocks 2 and 3 of the SST, unpredicted differences 
were observed in block 1. Specifically, GCSR appeared to be higher in ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS 
participants with low STAI-T scores compared to patient participants with high STAI-T scores. 
This inconsistent block 1 pattern generalised across analyses involving different recruitment 
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methods, and importantly, is inconsistent with hyper-reactive BISs underlying one type of 
clinical anxiety. Further exploration of its cause is required.  
 One potential explanation for the inconsistent block one result is that the observed trend 
was a product of random variation or error. This explanation is supported by the lack of 
statistical significance associated with these block 1 GCSR differences across both analyses. 
To explore this explanation further, analysis of a larger sample of SJS participants with ‘Below 
Cut-off’ STAI-T scores and anxious patients is required to investigate the reliability of the 
observed trend. If this trend is replicated and reaches statistical significance in a larger analysis, 
we can conclude that it is in fact a true effect warranting theoretical or practical explanation. 
However, if this trend is not replicated in a larger analysis, we can conclude it was merely a 
product of random variation.  
 Provided the inconsistent block 1 trend is replicated in a larger analysis in the future, 
there are some practical and theoretical explanations that may account for it. One practical 
explanation for the discrepant block 1 results is that SJS participants with ‘Below Cut-off’ 
STAI-T scores performed differently during the SST compared to patients and participants with 
‘Above Cut-off’ STAI-T scores. To further explore this hypothesis, a comparison of SST 
behavioural measures, which provide an indirect representation of the response style and 
strategy used by participants when completing the SST, was conducted. The behavioural 
measures obtained from ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants were specifically compared to those 
obtained from ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS and patient participants across all three blocks of the SST. 
If differences in response style and behaviour during the SST could account for the observed 
discrepant block one results, we would expect to observe similar behavioural measures in 




Figure 4.1. Behavioural measures calculated for ‘Below Cut-off’, ‘Above Cut-off’, and Patient 
participants in block 1, 2 and 3 of the SST (information also reported in Chapter 3, Table 3.7). GoRT = 
median reaction time in Go trials (ms); SSRT = Stop signal reaction time (ms) estimated using the horse 
race model; Pinhibit = probability of inhibiting response on Stop trials, for trials with short, medium and 
long SSDs respectively. 
 
‘Below Cut-off’ participants in block 1. As reported in Chapter 3 and repeated 
diagrammatically in Figure 4.1, there were no reliable differences in the percentage of correctly 
inhibited responses on short, medium, and long Stop trials in blocks 1, 2, or 3 in ‘Below Cut-
off’ SJS participants compared to patient and ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS participants. Furthermore, 
there were no reliable differences in Go Reaction Time (GoRT) or Stop Signal Reaction Time 




















































































participants. In fact, qualitative differences in SSRT and GoRT tended to be found more 
between ‘Above Cut-off’ and patient participants. Therefore, differences in behavioural 
measures, representing participant behaviour and strategy during the SST, do not account for 
the anomalous block 1 results. 
Although there are no clear practical explanations for the anomalous block 1 results, 
possible theoretical hypotheses must be considered. One hypothesised theoretical explanation 
is presented diagrammatically in Figure 4.2 below. According to this explanation, anxious 
patients and participants with high STAI-T scores take longer to adapt to the SST testing 
situation than participants with low STAI-T scores. This may result in anxious patients and 
‘Above Cut-off’ participants displaying higher levels of anticipatory goal conflict in both Go 
and Stop trials of short, medium and long SSD trials during block 1. As outlined in Chapter 2, 
individual GCSR is calculated by first subtracting the average Go power from the average Stop 
power to produce a Stop Signal Specific power value. Stop-Go differences averaged across 
both long and short SSD trials are then subtracted from the average Stop-Go differences in 
intermediate SSD trials to produce GCSR values. Critically, if patients and ‘Above Cut-off’ 
participants produce high levels of anticipatory conflict in both Go and Stop trials in block 1, 
there will be little power difference between Stop and Go trials resulting in only small Stop 
Signal Specific power values being obtained. This, in turn, will lead to the observation of 
weaker GCSR in block 1. In contrast, this theoretical explanation presumes that ‘Below Cut-
off’ participants adjust quickly to the SST situation and do not display anticipatory conflict in 
Go trials of block 1. Instead, goal conflict is only produced in Stop trials resulting in clearer 
Stop-Go power differences and the observation of stronger Stop Specific Power values. This 
may have led to the observation of stronger detected GCSR in ‘Below Cut-off’ participants in 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































According to this theoretical explanation, it is further predicted that as the patients and 
‘Above Cut-off’ participants adjust to the SST testing situation, their anticipatory goal conflict 
decreases in Go trials resulting in the production of stronger positive GCSR values in blocks 2 
and 3. Whereas GCSR values obtained by ‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants decrease during 
blocks 2 and 3 of the SST due to participants experiencing habituation to goal conflict. 
Importantly, this theoretical explanation is only a hypothesis and requires further research to 
investigate its accuracy. Restrictions of time prevented this study from investigating this 
hypothesis, however in the future, an analysis of the power produced during Stop and Go trials 
and the resulting stop-specific rhythmicity in short, intermediate, and long SSD trial across all 
three blocks of the SST is required. Importantly, this will allow our theoretical hypothesis to 
be tested and the predicted differences in Stop Specific power between patients and participants 
with high and low STAI-T scores to be directly explored 
Limitations Warranting Further Research 
This study contained some limitations that reduce the strength of conclusions made, and 
require modification in future research. Firstly, we did not assess for the presence of anxiety, 
fear, or panic symptoms in SJS participants via clinical interviews. SJS participants were not 
assessed for an anxiety disorder using the DSM-5 MINI for two main reasons: (1) Insufficient 
time and resources to administer the MINI to all participants during the study period; and (2) 
the MINI is effective at clarifying the type of mental disorder an individual is suffering from, 
however is not frequently used to identify an individual suffering from a mental disorder. 
Despite our justification for excluding the MINI, there was resulting uncertainty whether there 
were SJS participants who met criteria for diagnosis of an anxiety disorder within the SJS 
sample. It is quite possible there were SJS participants who were experiencing similar anxiety 
symptoms to patient participants. Separating SJS participants on the basis of STAI-T scores 
was an attempt to distinguish ‘anxious’ SJS participants from ‘non-anxious’ SJS participants, 
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however high STAI-T does not directly translate to an anxiety disorder diagnosis. Caution must 
be taken when using the  STAI-T scale as a diagnostic marker for anxiety as it is designed as a 
self-report personality measure rather than an anxiety disorder diagnostic marker and 
consequently may give rise to high rates of false positives. In the future, an anxiety screen for 
SJS participants should be incorporated into the methodology. This would allow detection of 
participants with symptoms that meet the diagnostic criteria for a DSM-5 anxiety disorder. The 
MINI would then be administered to participants who obtained a positive result on the anxiety 
screen to identify the appropriate diagnosis. Participants who screened positively would 
comprise a ‘patient’ sample and be could be compared to control SJS participants who did not 
meet diagnostic criteria for an anxiety disorder.   
A second limitation of this study was the analysis of only a small patient sample (patient N 
= 22). This was a direct result of difficulty recruiting patients during the study period due to a 
low response rate to newspaper and supermarket advertisements and a delay in the development 
of an online advertisement and recruitment program. Critically, recruitment of only a small 
patient sample restricted the type of analyses that could be conducted and the hypotheses that 
could be investigated. In this small patient sample, individuals with a range of DSM-5 anxiety 
disorder subtypes were combined into one group, incorporating both disorders of ‘defensive 
avoidance’ and disorders of ‘defensive approach’. Based on theoretical predictions that only 
individuals with disorders of defensive approach will have hyper-reactive BISs, it is likely that 
the average GCSR signal obtained from this patient sample was attenuated by combining 
disorders of defensive avoidance and approach. In the future, recruitment of a larger sample of 
patients diagnosed with DSM-5 anxiety disorders will allow exclusion of individuals predicted 
to suffer from disorders of ‘defensive avoidance’ from the ‘clinical anxiety’ group. Based on 
the assumption that DSM-5 diagnoses such as GAD are more likely to contain people suffering 
from disorders of ‘defensive approach’ and panic disorder more likely to contain people 
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suffering from disorders of ‘defensive avoidance’, we would predict that analysing a ‘pure’ 
group of individuals with disorders of ‘defensive approach’ will result in an even stronger 
GCSR signal being detected. Future analyses of a larger group of patients will also increase the 
power of statistical analyses, increase the likelihood of detecting true differences, and will 
allow more precise investigation of the relationship between GCSR and specific types of DSM-
5 anxiety disorder diagnosis and/or specific symptomatology.  
A third limitation of this study was the lack of an appropriate ‘healthy’ control group for 
comparison with the anxiety patient sample. In the present study, a sample of nominally 
‘healthy’ SJS participants was used as a control group for the sample of anxiety disorder 
patients. There were limitations associated with the use of this control group as it was not 
matched to the patient sample for gender, age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status or other 
demographic characteristics. It is possible that differences in these demographic factors 
contributed to the group differences in GCSR observed. Furthermore, the patient sample was 
recruited via a different method from the SJS sample, thus introducing a potential sampling 
bias.  
The design of this study attempted to compensate for the lack of an appropriately 
matched non-anxious ‘healthy’ control group. The first step of this study comparing matched 
‘Above Cut-off’ and ‘Below Cut-off’ STAI-T groups, controlled for important demographic 
and recruitment variables. Critically, in this matched analysis, any differences in GCSR 
between high and low STAI-T groups were attributed to STAI-T. The second step of this study 
compared ‘Above’ and ‘Below’ Cut-off groups, with a patient group who reported particularly 
high STAI-T scores. In this comparison, we predicted that if the patients had similar, or more 
extreme, GCSR to the ‘Above Cut-off’ SJS group, GCSR differences between patients and 
‘Below Cut-off’ SJS participants could be attributed to STAI-T and clinical anxiety, rather than 
sampling biases. This two-step study design provided some control for potential sampling 
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biases and confounding factors that could have distorted or masked true GCSR differences 
between groups. As a result, we cautiously conclude that GCSR appears to be higher in 
individuals experiencing clinical anxiety. Nonetheless, proper control groups are required in 
future studies to address this limited study design and allow reliable validation of GCSR as a 
biomarker for clinical anxiety, and not merely an anxiolytic sensitive biomarker.  
The selection of appropriate control groups is difficult but fundamental to allowing the 
drawing of conclusions around whether GCSR differences are most likely attributable to 
clinical anxiety, or to other factors such as demographic variables, differing recruitment 
methods, other mental disorders or psychopathology in general. In future studies, a healthy 
control group, representative of individuals in the general population who do not experience 
symptoms of anxiety, should be included. A variety of recruitment methods may be used to 
obtain a population representative sample (e.g. selecting from electoral role and then screening 
and separating individuals who have an anxiety disorder diagnosis from those who do not). 
Control individuals would then need to be matched to patient participants on important 
demographic factors such as gender, age, ethnicity and SES. Additionally, inclusion of 
psychiatric control groups in future studies will allow precise investigation of the specificity of 
GCSR to clinical anxiety rather than other mental disorders or psychopathology in general. For 
example, identical recruitment methods could be used to select a sample of patients with DSM-
5 anxiety disorders and little or no Major Depression and a sample of individuals with DSM-5 
Major Depression but little or no anxiety. These samples could then be matched to each other 
based on demographic factors. A comparison of GCSR strength between the two groups would 
assess whether GCSR is a biological biomarker for anxiety, depression, or a trait that underlies 
psychopathology in general. A similar approach could be taken on other mental disorders to 
investigate the specificity of GCSR to clinical anxiety. Additionally, a separate analysis of 
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GCSR within males and females is required as thus far all analyses have been performed on 
samples of males and females together.  
The Exciting Road Ahead 
Validation of our EEG biomarker within a large DSM-5 ‘Anxiety disorder’ patient sample is 
the first step in transforming current symptom based diagnostic systems to more rational and 
biologically grounded systems. Once GCSR is reliably validated as a biomarker for ‘clinical 
anxiety’ within a large patient sample, the focus of future research should turn to disentangling 
the precise organic structure of DSM-5 anxiety disorder diagnoses and developing additional 
biomarkers for other dysfunctional processes underlying specific mental disorders.  
Given the pharmacological and preclinical neuropsychological findings outlined in 
Chapter 1, it appears there is a distinction between the underlying processes of ‘fear’ and the 
underlying processes of ‘anxiety’. This distinction is neither recognised nor clear in current 
symptom based diagnostic systems for mental disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013; World Health Organization, 2010). The differential therapeutic effects of anxiolytics and 
panicolytics on distinct DSM-5 anxiety subtypes (Corr & McNaughton, 2016; McNaughton, 
2014) suggests the structure of DSM-5 has at least some neural grounding. Drugs, which 
change the frequency of GCSR, are more effective in treating some DSM-5 anxiety diagnoses 
than others (i.e. anxiolytics treat some cases of GAD, but generally not panic). This suggests 
that high GCSR scorers may be more likely to fall within certain subtypes of DSM-5 anxiety 
disorders (e.g. GAD). The next step is to investigate the precise relationship of GCSR to 
specific sub-types of DSM-5 ‘anxiety’.  
Based on McNaughton and Corr (2004)’s theory, it is predicted that there will be a 
group difference in GCSR strength between disorders of defensive approach (GAD, SAD, and 
Agoraphobia) and disorders of defensive avoidance (Panic disorder, Specific phobia, OCD). 
This group difference will be particularly strong when comparing GAD against Primary panic, 
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and when potential cases of co-morbidity are excluded from the participant sample. However, 
despite expecting some group differences, it is also predicted that negative GCSR cases in the 
‘defensive approach’ (i.e. anxiety) groups and positive GCSR cases in the ‘defensive 
avoidance’ (i.e. fear) groups will be observed. For example, some cases of GAD will be caused 
by high GCSR whereas other cases not (anxiolytics are only effective in some cases of GAD). 
Similarly, some cases of panic disorder may have developed secondary to anxiety/ hyper-
reactivity of the BIS. Thus, individuals with both anxiety and panic could have a mix of high 
GCSR and normal with the latter being associated with more primary panic dysfunction.  
While exploration of the organic structure underlying DSM-5 anxiety disorder 
diagnostic labels is an important next step, attempts to move away from reliance on DSM-5 
criteria to classify patient groups is also required in future research. Current and previous 
studies investigating GCSR rely on DSM-5 diagnostic criteria to create patient groups. 
However, as outlined in Chapter 1, there are major limitations associated with the DSM-5, and 
diagnostic criteria focused on symptom presentations appears to be arbitrary. It is predicted 
that within a specific DSM-5 anxiety disorder diagnostic category, there will be individuals 
with different dysfunctional processes underlying their symptom presentation. In the future, 
separating groups based on GCSR strength and exploring the associated group outcomes will 
likely give rise to a clearer understanding of the superficial symptom profile and observable 
outcomes of individuals who commonly share hyper-reactive BISs.  
Biological biomarkers for other types of anxiety and mental disorders are urgently 
required to address the serious limitations inherent in current diagnostic systems. A clear 
direction for future exploration is the identification and development of biomarkers for 
processes of defensive avoidance. An obvious place to start would be with Klein (1994)'s  
theory predicting that individuals with panic disorder display a lower ‘suffocation alarm 
threshold’ and are therefore more likely to produce spontaneous panic when exposed to a 
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suffocation provocation test (i.e. CO2 inhalation) than patients without panic or healthy 
controls. This theory has been supported by research showing that individuals with panic 
disorder have a lower panic threshold to carbon dioxide (CO2) inhalation and are more likely 
to experience CO2 induced panic attacks compared to a range of clinical populations including 
depressed patients (Kent et al., 2001). Developing a clearer understanding of the underlying 
biological dysfunction of specific DSM-5 anxiety sub-types and other mental disorders will 
shift the focus of current diagnostic systems away from an over-reliance on superficial 
symptom profiles. Importantly, identification and validation of distinct biological biomarkers 
for unique pathological processes will greatly enhance treatment selection and delivery. This 
is one valuable piece of the puzzle required to combat the concerning poor delivery of adequate 
‘quality care’ treatments for anxiety (Mendlowicz & Stein, 2014).   
Conclusion 
The present results hold significant promise for improving current mental disorder 
diagnostic systems. In chapter 1, I argued that DSM-5 diagnoses do not reflect underlying 
neural dysfunction but instead focus on the patient’s superficial symptoms. This means that 
patients with distinct neural pathologies may present with similar symptom profiles. 
Conversely, patients with the same underlying dysfunction may present with a diverse array of 
symptom profiles. Using the current symptom-based diagnostic systems, there is no way of 
assessing what the true neural pathology underlying symptom presentation is and, as a result, 
the selection of effective treatments is seriously compromised.  
The results of the present study provide preliminary evidence that GCSR is the first 
ever biomarker for clinical anxiety. While further research is required to strengthen 
conclusions, this finding is ground-breaking and holds strong potential to alleviate a significant 
amount of the personal and economic burden of mental disorders currently weighing on 
individuals, families and communities. The ongoing development of distinct biomarkers for 
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unique processes underlying psychopathology in the future will allow more accurate diagnosis 
of mental disorders. Furthermore, biomarkers may be used to predict treatment response, and 
therefore will enhance the selection and implementation of effective treatments to individuals 
suffering from mental disorders. The results of the present study appear to signal the dawning 
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Appendix B: Supermarket advertisement used to recruit patient 
participants 
The Psychology Department is looking for volunteers for a
research study into patterns of electrical activity in the brain
associated with anxiety. If you are male or female, aged 18-
40, otherwise healthy, and considering seeking, or have not
yet started, treatment for your symptoms then please
contact Shabah by phone (03-479 5835) or e-mail
(shabah.shadli@otago.ac.nz) for an information sheet.








































































































































































































































































By Jamie Morton 
10:40 AM Thursday Jul 14, 2016  
Arachnophobia is a common form of anxiety. Photo / Getty Images  
A Kiwi researcher aiming to create the world's first biomarker for a psychiatric disorder is 
appealing for help from those who suffer from anxiety. 
Professor Neil McNaughton, of Otago University's Department of Psychology, is trying to 
transform nearly 50 years of theoretical research into a novel tool that could help clinicians 
quickly and easily diagnose sufferers of anxiety -- and prescribe the right medication. 
Such a leap would be "game-changing" for tackling what remained one of the most common 
mental disorders in New Zealand: more than 200,000 Kiwis have been diagnosed with a 
anxiety disorder at some point in their lives. 
Over recent decades, McNaughton and his colleagues have developed a detailed theory of 
how, in certain brain structures, hyperactivity generates abnormal symptoms and "hyper-
reactivity" leads to specific clinical syndromes. 
Their work has also sought non-invasive ways to measure how so-called "threat-approach" 
and "behavioural inhibitions" systems were activated in anxiety sufferers. 
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In a three-year study supported by a million-dollar Health Research Council grant, 
McNaughton wants to test whether a specially developed biological marker could measure 
brain reactions of untreated anxiety sufferers that would show that they could be placed into 
distinct groups and treated accordingly. 
"The most important thing I'm interested in asking is, are some patients different from others 
in a way that doesn't match the standard symptomatic diagnosis that we get these days?" 
A biological marker, he said, should be able to predict treatment efficacy better than current 
symptom-based diagnoses, while boosting treatment results and cost-effectiveness. 
The marker would measure an electrical rhythm generated by a particular part of the brain in 
response to "goal conflict" in a task. 
"A doctor could, in principle, use this by fitting an electrode cap on the patient and running 
them through the test," McNaughton said. 
"Unfortunately, at the moment, it is not sensitive enough for diagnosis of a single person and 
cannot be used for repeat testing." 
But it could be used to test effects of drugs in groups of people, and McNaughton and his 
colleagues hoped to use it as an anchor to develop clinically useful diagnostic tests. 
"I'd like to think that, if this works, we'll have the first genuine biomarker for any psychiatric 
disorder," he said. 
"While some people might argue around the edges as to whether there are some already, 
certainly, for anxiety, this would be pretty much a game changer." 
This was because it would provide a "solid biological basis" for giving sufferers a diagnosis 
that allowed clinicians to determine the best the treatment for them, he said. 
"At the moment, a patient will walk in with a whole mass of symptoms. It's always a mess, 
and if you try one drug, then 30 per cent of the time you may be lucky. 
"If we could change that to just checking out the patient with a simple test that tells you what 
to treat them with, then that would be a major improvement." 
It didn't necessarily have to be drugs that the marker indicated as the best treatment option, he 
said. 
"In fact, there are a lot of reasons for supposing anti-anxiety drugs are not particularly good at 
treating anxiety, but just for holding the symptoms down, kind of like aspirin rather than an 
antibiotic." 
McNaughton is extending the study from Dunedin to other regions, including Auckland, and 
is keen to hear from people willing to take part. 
"We need not only people who have some kind of anxiety disorder, but also those who don't, 
so we can draw comparisons between them." 
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*People interested in participating could reach him on anxiety@otago.ac.nz. 
ANXIETY IN NEW ZEALAND 
&bull: Anxiety disorders are very common among Kiwis. The 2011/2012 New Zealand 
Health Survey indicated that 6.1 per cent of Kiwis -- or more than 200,000 people -- had been 
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder at some point. These included generalised anxiety 
disorder, phobias, post-traumatic stress disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder. 
• Rates were highest among women -- 7.7 per cent, compared with 4.4 per cent of men -- and 
anxiety disorder was particularly high among women aged between 25 and 54. 
&bull: According to the Health Loss in New Zealand study, anxiety, along with depressive 
disorders, were the second leading cause of health loss for New Zealanders, accounting for 
5.3 per cent of all health loss, behind only coronary heart disease. For women, they were the 
leading cause. 
- NZ Herald  











































































































You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage 



















1. I have read the Information Sheet concerning this study and understand the aims of this 
research project. 
2. I have had sufficient time to talk with other people of my choice about participating in 
the study.   
3. I confirm that I meet the criteria for participation which are explained in the Information 
Sheet. 
4. All my questions about the project have been answered to my satisfaction, and I 
understand that I am free to request further information at any stage.  
5. I know that my participation in the project is entirely voluntary, and that I am free to 
withdraw from the project at any time without disadvantage. 
6. I am aware that undergraduate students will be present and will carry out some parts of 
the experiment. 
7. I know that as a participant I will undergo electrical (EEG/ECG/GSR) testing, physical 
and mental health screening, and a qualitative urine test for psychotropic drugs and 
complete questionnaires assessing emotion, as listed in the information sheet. I 
understand that I may decline to answer any interview or questionnaire question without 
disadvantage of any kind. 
8. I know that no personal identifying information will be included in the paper records and 
electronic files which represent the data from the project, and that these will be placed in 
secure storage and kept for at least ten years.  
9. I understand the nature and size of the risks of discomfort or harm that are explained in the 
Information Sheet, including the rare risk of computer screen-induced seizures. 
10. I understand that the results of the project may be published but my anonymity will be 
preserved and only group data reported. 
 




   (Full name) 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 













































































































































You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to 























1. I have read the Information Sheet concerning this study and understand the aims of this 
research project. 
2. I have had sufficient time to talk with other people of my choice about participating in 
the study.   
3. I confirm that I meet the criteria for participation which are explained in the Information 
Sheet. 
4. All my questions about the project have been answered to my satisfaction, and I 
understand that I am free to request further information at any stage.  
5. I know that my participation in the project is entirely voluntary, and that I am free to 
withdraw from the project at any time without disadvantage. 
6. I am aware that undergraduate students will be present and will carry out some parts of 
the experiment. 
7. I know that as a participant I will undergo electrical (EEG/ECG/GSR) testing, physical 
and mental health screening, and a qualitative urine test for psychotropic drugs and 
complete questionnaires assessing emotion, as listed in the information sheet. I 
understand that I may decline to answer any interview or questionnaire question without 
disadvantage of any kind. 
8. I know that no personal identifying information will be included in the paper records and 
electronic files which represent the data from the project, and that these will be placed in 
secure storage and kept for at least ten years.  
9. I understand the nature and size of the risks of discomfort or harm that are explained in the 
Information Sheet, including the rare risk of computer screen-induced seizures. 
10. I understand that the results of the project may be published but my anonymity will be 
preserved and only group data reported. 
 
I agree to take part in this project.  
I agree that my GP can be contacted for information about my health and to receive health 
related information about me from this project 
 
…………………………………………………                     …………………………………… 
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Appendix G: Questionnaire Part 2 
Sleep	Questions	
We	want	to	ask	you	some	questions	about	your	sleep	
Please	select	an	answer	to	the	question	from	the	drop	down	list	
-----	
In	general,	what	time	do	you	go	to	sleep	each	night?	
6pm-8pm	
8pm-10pm	
10pm-midnight	
midnight-2am	
2am-4am	
4am-6am	
-----	
In	general,	what	time	do	you	wake	up	each	morning?	
2am-4am	
4am-6am	
6am-8am	
8am-10am	
10am-midday	
midday	or	later	
-----	
In	general,	how	variable	is	your	sleep	start	time	between	different	nights?	
0-30	minutes	
30	minutes	-	1	hour	
1	hour	-	1.5	hours	
1.5	hours	-	2	hours	
2	hours	or	more	
-----	
In	general,	how	long	does	it	usually	take	you	to	get	to	sleep	each	night?	
0-30	minutes	
30	minutes	-	1	hour	
1	hour	-	1.5	hours	
1.5	hours	-	2	hours	
2	hours	or	more	
-----	
I	use	an	alarm	to	wake	me	up...	
Never	
Only	for	early	events	
Often	
Always	
-----	
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How	often	do	you	wake	up	during	the	night?	
0	
1-2	
3-4	
5+	
-----	
If	you	wake	up	in	the	night,	how	long	does	it	generally	take	you	to	fall	back	asleep?	
0-10	minutes	
10-20	minutes	
20-30	minutes	
30	minutes	or	more	
-----	
On	average,	how	many	total	hours	do	you	sleep	per	night?	
0-2	
2-4	
4-6	
6-8	
8-10	
10+	
-----	
Depression	Question	
We	want	to	ask	you	a	question	about	your	past	experience	with	depression.	
Please	select	an	answer	to	the	question	from	the	drop	down	list	
-----	
Which	statement	about	past	substantial	(more	than	a	few	days)	periods	of	depression	is	most	true	
for	you?	
I	have	never	been	depressed	for	more	than	a	few	days	at	a	time.	
I	have	experienced	a	period	of	substantial	depression.	
I	have	experienced	multiple	periods	of	substantial	depression.	
I	have	experienced	a	period	of	clinically	diagnosed	depression.	
I	have	experienced	multiple	periods	of	clinically	diagnosed	depression.	
I	have	experienced	a	period	of	clinically	diagnosed	major	depressive	disorder.	
I	have	experienced	multiple	periods	of	clinically	diagnosed	major	depressive	disorder.	
-----	
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The	Personality	Inventory	for	DSM-5	
This	is	a	list	of	things	different	people	might	say	about	themselves.		We	are	interested	in	how	you	
would	describe	yourself.		There	are	no	right	or	wrong	answers.		So	you	can	describe	yourself	as	
honestly	as	possible,	we	will	keep	your	responses	confidential.		We'd	like	you	to	take	your	time	and	
read	each	statement	carefully,	selecting	the	response	that	best	describes	you.	
*The	response	format	for	all	PID-5	items	is:	
Very	False	or	Often	False	
Sometimes	or	Somewhat	False	
Sometimes	or	Somewhat	True	
Very	True	or	Often	True	
-----	
I	don't	get	as	much	pleasure	out	of	things	as	others	seem	to.	
People	would	describe	me	as	reckless.	
I	avoid	risky	situations.	
When	it	comes	to	my	emotions,	people	tell	me	I'm	a	"cold	fish".	
I	prefer	not	to	get	too	close	to	people.	
I	dread	being	without	someone	to	love	me.	
My	emotions	sometimes	change	for	no	good	reason.	
I	keep	to	myself.	
Nothing	seems	to	interest	me	very	much.	
I	almost	never	enjoy	life.	
I	often	feel	like	nothing	I	do	really	matters.	
I'm	an	energetic	person.	
I	avoid	risky	sports	and	activities.	
I	have	no	limits	when	it	comes	to	doing	dangerous	things.	
I	don't	have	very	long-lasting	emotional	reactions	to	things.	
It	is	hard	for	me	to	stop	an	activity,	even	when	it’s	time	to	do	so.	
I	do	a	lot	of	things	that	others	consider	risky.	
I	worry	a	lot	about	being	alone.	
I've	missed	out	on	things	because	I	was	busy	trying	to	get	something	I	was	doing	exactly	right.	
I’d	rather	be	in	a	bad	relationship	than	be	alone.	
I	keep	approaching	things	the	same	way,	even	when	it	isn’t	working.	
I'm	very	dissatisfied	with	myself.	
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I	have	much	stronger	emotional	reactions	than	almost	everyone	else.	
I	can't	stand	being	left	alone,	even	for	a	few	hours.	
The	future	looks	really	hopeless	to	me.	
I	like	to	take	risks.	
When	I	want	to	do	something,	I	don't	let	the	possibility	that	it	might	be	risky	stop	me.	
I	go	out	of	my	way	to	avoid	any	kind	of	group	activity.	
It	is	hard	for	me	to	shift	from	one	activity	to	another.	
I	worry	a	lot	about	terrible	things	that	might	happen.	
I	have	trouble	changing	how	I'm	doing	something	even	if	what	I'm	doing	isn't	going	well.	
The	world	would	be	better	off	if	I	were	dead.	
I	keep	my	distance	from	people.	
I	don't	get	emotional.	
I'm	so	ashamed	by	how	I've	let	people	down	in	lots	of	little	ways.	
I	avoid	anything	that	might	be	even	a	little	bit	dangerous.	
I	prefer	to	keep	romance	out	of	my	life.	
I	don't	show	emotions	strongly.	
I	often	worry	that	something	bad	will	happen	due	to	mistakes	I	made	in	the	past.	
I	get	very	nervous	when	I	think	about	the	future.	
I	rarely	worry	about	things.	
I	enjoy	being	in	love.	
I	prefer	to	play	it	safe	rather	than	take	unnecessary	chances.	
I	get	fixated	on	certain	things	and	can’t	stop.	
People	tell	me	it's	difficult	to	know	what	I'm	feeling.	
I	am	a	highly	emotional	person.	
I	often	feel	like	a	failure.	
I	break	off	relationships	if	they	start	to	get	close.	
I’m	always	worrying	about	something.	
I	worry	about	almost	everything.	
I	don't	mind	a	little	risk	now	and	then.	
I	talk	about	suicide	a	lot.	
I'm	just	not	very	interested	in	having	sexual	relationships.	
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I	get	stuck	on	things	a	lot.	
I	get	emotional	easily,	often	for	very	little	reason.	
I	almost	never	feel	happy	about	my	day-to-day	activities.	
I	fear	being	alone	in	life	more	than	anything	else.	
I	get	stuck	on	one	way	of	doing	things,	even	when	it's	clear	it	won't	work.	
I	am	a	very	anxious	person.	
I	don’t	like	spending	time	with	others.	
I	feel	compelled	to	go	on	with	things	even	when	it	makes	little	sense	to	do	so.	
I	never	know	where	my	emotions	will	go	from	moment	to	moment.	
I	always	expect	the	worst	to	happen.	
I	steer	clear	of	romantic	relationships.	
I'm	not	interested	in	making	friends.	
I	say	as	little	as	possible	when	dealing	with	people.	
I'm	useless	as	a	person.	
I'll	do	just	about	anything	to	keep	someone	from	abandoning	me.	
Life	looks	pretty	bleak	to	me.	
I	really	live	life	to	the	fullest.	
Nothing	seems	to	make	me	feel	good.	
I	do	what	I	want	regardless	of	how	unsafe	it	might	be.	
I	don’t	like	to	get	too	close	to	people.	
Everything	seems	pointless	to	me.	
I	never	take	risks.	
I	get	emotional	over	every	little	thing.	
I	never	show	emotions	to	others.	
I	often	feel	just	miserable.	
I	have	no	worth	as	a	person.	
I'm	always	fearful	or	on	edge	about	bad	things	that	might	happen.	
I	never	want	to	be	alone.	
I	know	I'll	commit	suicide	sooner	or	later.	
My	emotions	are	unpredictable.	
I	don't	deal	with	people	unless	I	have	to.	
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I	don't	react	much	to	things	that	seem	to	make	others	emotional.	
I	avoid	social	events.	
I	rarely	get	enthusiastic	about	anything.	
I	don't	think	about	getting	hurt	when	I'm	doing	things	that	might	be	dangerous.	
I	prefer	being	alone	to	having	a	close	romantic	partner.	
I	feel	guilty	much	of	the	time.	
I	hate	to	take	chances.	
			
	
 
